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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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1 NOVEMBER 1986

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1 November 1986

## MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

## REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF TROOPS AT CHERNOBYL

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORYZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 86 (Signed to press 19 Jun 86) pp 78-81

[Article by Maj S. Lavrentyev, KOMMUNIST VOORYZHENNYKH SIL Special Correspondent: "The Energy of Courage"]

[Text] The traffic controller at the checkpoint shows with his baton that the way ahead is open, and our armored reconnaissance vehicle [BTR-80], picking up speed, enters the 30 km zone. The map which Sgt Nikolay Volchenkov, the crew commander, placed on his knees for convenience showed our further route of movement. The brown line goes to the city of Pripyet, intersects it and continues farther to the AES [nuclear electric power plant]. It skirts around the fourth reactor, making a loop, and goes to the landing. Then it continues on to the substation. Along the route are marked places where it is necessary to measure the radiation level. However, it is still rather far to the first of these points. And there is still a little time to continue our conversation with Capt Vladimir Dolya, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, seeing that Pvt Sergey Nishtak was skillfully driving the combat vehicle.

From previous conversations, briefly with Capt Dolya and with other officers, Sergey Necheporenko, secretary of the battalion party organization and Aleksandr Gubin and Pavel Guzenko, company political workers, I know that upon arriving here soon after the accident the subunit specialists immediately began to conduct radiation reconnaissance in the area of the station and to accomplish other tasks. And each of them who contributed to the common, very difficult and risky work his strength, courage, and skill, marked himself here uniquely.

According to the comments of senior officers, this battalion is distinguished by a special level of organization, firm discipline and high skill. There was no case when any of the soldiers in the subunit demonstrated weakness in the face of danger or blundered while working in the zone. On the other hand, there are dozens of examples indicating that here at Chernobyl a heroic feat is accomplished. Here are but a few notes made in my note pad. They are similar to front line reports from the forward edge.

...During the day sergeants Mikhail Kalita, squad commander, and Aleksey Nechaykin, chemical reconnaissance soldier, and driver Vasilii Kushchenko worked in the area of the AES. At night came the order to go immediately to the station. The situation was that there was no one other than this crew to fulfill the order. Sergeants Kalita, Nechaykin and Kushchenko volunteered. Until morning they made two trips to the AES and accomplished the necessary work.

...Driver Pvt Konstantin Mamyar requested of his commander to be sent first to the station to conduct radiation reconnaissance. For two days the soldier stayed in the danger zone, virtually without sleep or rest. He fulfilled all assigned tasks.

...Officer Aleksandr Nazarenko, platoon commander, Sgt Aleksandr Kilrenko, squad commander and PFC Ivan Pasechnyy, chemical reconnaissance soldier, monitored a special apparatus for measuring the radiation level in the vicinity of the AES. One more day was required to complete the work. All three remained in the danger zone and fulfilled the order by the time established.

Talking about these and many other examples during our first meeting at the tent city, Capt Dolya remarked that it is not blind impulse, nor a desire to amaze everyone with one's valor, but the aspiration to fulfill the order and readiness for self-sacrifice which moves people. It is not even a quality, but rather a special military psychology, expressed in a drive for action, often associated with great difficulties and considerable risk. And it is also expressed in responsibility. Not only for the outcome of the job, but also for their comrades and the equipment entrusted to them.

Yes, it is very difficult to be imbued with such psychology. However, without it, he is sure, one cannot work here. To indoctrinate and maintain in people constant readiness to fulfill the order is the main task of political workers and the party and komsomol aktiv. And here one cannot get by without personal example. It is not for nothing that they say: Words summon but examples inspire, lead and teach.

Under difficult conditions the example of the political worker is the tuning fork, according to which people attune themselves. It is precisely from this example that they gather additional forces, courage and staunchness, when the intolerable heat of danger seemingly scorches their faces. According to the example of the political worker, people check how each day is lived and what is done for the common cause.

One of the political workers is Aleksandr Yegorovich Gubin. In the opinion of Capt Dolya his special training is at the level of a company commander. He was one of the first in the battalion to go to fulfill tasks in the reactor zone. The command decided that Gubin possessed the skills and qualities necessary to conduct reconnaissance in these most tense days. And the company deputy commander for political affairs justified this high trust. All the tasks assigned to his crew were fulfilled.

Among Gubin's subordinates is a soldier named Pvt Grigoriy Teplitskiy. Without going into details, one can say about him that he did not immediately adapt in the difficult environment. He did not have sufficient strength of purpose or self discipline.

When the opportunity presented itself Gubin had a talk with this soldier. What did he talk about? Plain, ordinary words about the high responsibility placed on each specialist in the company for fulfilling the tasks in the area of the station, about duty and about his comrades who were operating courageously and capably. But, in this situation even this turned out to be enough. After the conversation with the political worker, one could not recognize Pvt Teplitskiy. First the soldier distinguished himself working at the "Mogilnik" [burying beetle] machine used for burying radioactive debris. He was awarded a certificate. Then, when all the drivers were busy and it was necessary to go urgently to the reactor zone, Teplitskiy was called to accomplish this task. It turned out that he has a driver's license. The vehicle was entrusted to the soldier and he did not fail. Twice he travelled to the area of the station and accomplished the tasks.

This episode again emphasizes the well known truth that the strength of the indoctrinary influence of the political worker's words depends directly on how visible, vivid and attractive his personal example is to people.

In the battalion the main sector for the political workers is the forward edge, where the success of the work is decided. They go out for radiation reconnaissance conducted by crew commanders in the areas where posts have been set up and decontamination is being conducted. There, at the spearpoint of danger, even the presence of a political worker alone and his fervent, heartfelt summons mobilizes the forces of the sergeants and soldiers and helps them overcome difficulties and be victorious.

However, the "forward edge" has a rather wide front and there is but one deputy for political affairs in the battalion and each company. He simply cannot be everywhere, in order to inspire people with his personal example, just as the subunit commanders cannot. Is this a problem? Yes. But only if the aktiv is passive. And in the battalion it is active. Here are just some examples.

Party organization secretary Necheporenko and a group of soldiers were conducting decontamination of a sector of terrain with a high level of radiation. They took away the upper layer of soil. Is it necessary to say that this is difficult work, associated with definite risk? But the task was accomplished well and on time. This was largely due to the personal example of Communist Necheporenko.

Aleksey Yermishin, secretary of a company komsomol buro, was one of the first to go to conduct radiation reconnaissance in the area of the reactor, and provided such necessary accurate data. Then he explained to the crew commanders and chemical reconnaissance troops how to operate better under difficult conditions and use their instruments.

Here is an instructive detail. Under the conditions in which battalion personnel are operating there is no opportunity to meet and talk for long. Everyone is busy accomplishing tasks on the routes, posts and objects, working in the vehicle park day and night, preparing equipment to be used in the zone. But, despite this it is necessary to instruct the aktiv, assign them their missions and provide them with new information. And this is done continuously, at a brief evening meeting, during trips by political workers to the sectors where people are working and briefly just before crews or teams leave for a task.

Lt Necheporenko, the party organization secretary, stated he still does not cease to be amazed at the ability of Capt Dolya to explain their missions to the activists in literally a few phrases and to recommend how better to conduct the work. There are no general, noncommittal or empty discourses. There are short, meaningful instructions.

The gray strip of concrete road swiftly runs under the wheels of our BRDM. There are few oncoming vehicles, but one is immediately struck by the fact that all are moving at high speed. And this is not only because here, in the zone, outstanding drivers are working. There is also another explanation. In an area with a high level of radiation everything must be done not only well and precisely, but also at maximum speed. This reduces the danger.

Suddenly there come to mind the words stated by one of the political workers. "People's courage withstands that unseen danger which remained after the accident, and is defeating it." I repeat these words to Capt Dolya. The officer does not immediately express his opinion. He, in general, is not quick to make assessments when the situation does not require.

"In general, that is well stated," Vladimir Alekseyevich says finally. "Only, in my view, a small clarification is needed. Professional competence in making decisions, skill, precision and the highest sense of responsibility in fulfilling them in each sector -- that is what decides the outcome. And courage... Courage is that necessary quality which enables a man to display all of his ability and knowledge in emergency conditions, and take on whatever the situation demands.

"What, is that prosaic?" smiles Capt Dolya. "On the other hand, in my view, it is accurate."

Sgt Volchenkov, the crew commander, reminds us that it is time to put on the respirators. Ahead is a contaminated sector of road. This means that we will continue in silence. There is time to think a bit about the officer's words. They strike home and, I believe, enlighten the main aspect of the example of the political worker and activist.

Here in the special zone it is not only dangerous but, forgive my sharpness, it is criminal to act hastily. Here the price of an incompetent decision or rash step may be too high -- people's lives. Yes, risk is unavoidable, but it is minimized by strict calculations, the ability to get the maximum out of modern equipment, instruments, and apparatuses, and utmost organization and discipline. Therefore, the political worker and activist must not merely be



where people are carrying out their difficult daily labor. They need the ability not only to urge people on, but also, when the situation dictates, to organize things and demonstrate an example of solving one or another task, relying on thorough, specialized knowledge and firm skills.

Officer Viktor Kravtsov, deputy secretary of the battalion komsomol committee, and Communist Msgt Nikolay Dukhno in readying the "burial ground" to bury radioactive debris, capably organized the work of the soldiers and overfulfilled the assignment. In doing this the people received small doses of radiation. The use of interchangeability enabled the personnel to remain for a short time in the danger zone.

At one time one of the companies lacked equipment. Deputy Commander for Political Affairs Gubin added these duties to his own. Having excellent knowledge of the vehicles and the condition of each, when necessary he helped the soldiers conduct repairs. Along the way he organized classes on technical training and explained how to use the instruments correctly. In the company there was no time that a vehicle was unable to accomplish the missions. This is to the great credit of Officer Gubin.

The commanders, political workers and party and komsomol organizations see ensuring constant readiness of the equipment and improving the knowledge and skills of the men not only as the basis for accomplishing the tasks. It also demonstrates their concern about people. In the environment in which the crews are working a vehicle breakdown or inability or technical incompetence of one of the specialists risks calamity.

The specific nature of the tasks being accomplished by the subunit does not permit the organization of mass measures. But this in no way means that people will not hear the urging and mobilizing words of the political workers and party and komsomol activists. Political lessons are conducted regularly. Every day, and sometimes at night as well, Captain Dolya, Lt Necheporenko and Lt Vladimir Byagilev, secretary of the battalion komsomol committee, go out to the places where the people are working: to the posts, the decontamination sectors and various facilities. They inform the personnel about the political goings-on in the world, discuss the situation at the station and talk about the soldiers, sergeants and officers in the battalion who have distinguished themselves.

The address made by the military soviet of the Red Banner Kiev Military District to the personnel taking part in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the AES had a great mobilizing effect on the soldiers. It contains these lines: "Military friends! The one-on-one combat is still not completed. There is still much to be done, so that people with a feeling of deep gratitude can say: 'These are the ones who tamed the atom which ran out of control.'"

The soldiers understand that thousands of people, scientists and specialists in various areas of knowledge, are taking part directly and indirectly in eliminating the consequences of the accident. Hundreds of volunteers who have come from various republics and oblasts are working along with the soldiers,

decontaminating the buildings, structures, roads, gardens and fields. The whole country has taken the misfortune of Chernobyl close to heart.

The talks about courage and skill which political workers and activists are conducting cause in people a feeling of spiritual revelation. Each seems to step aside and look at his own work, strictly evaluates his own deeds and asks himself the question: "Could I do this?" From such a frame of mind begins the ascent toward the accomplishment of a heroic feat.

The damaged reactor is already behind us. Now it is necessary to take a measurement near the substation. The combat vehicle drives off the road. Sgt Volchenkov takes readings from the instruments and jots them down in a special notebook.

The mission is completed. We go back. At the decontamination post our BRDM goes under a "shower." The strong, fast jets of water beat against the armor, washing off the truly deadly gifts of the zone. Then was the dosimetric monitoring check at the post. The instrument shows that the vehicle is normal. Here our paths diverge. I must return and the crew along with Captain Dolya will again go to the station.

Watching the rapidly departing combat vehicle I think warm thoughts about the people whom the journalist's road brought me in contact with here, in the Chernobyl area. I think about their difficult, dangerous and most crucial work. When one meets such people as these they enter the heart immediately, with the accuracy of a cartridge placed in a breach block.

The time will come when the high voltage line leading from the station will come to life and begin to feed energy to plants, factories and farms. And everyone who turns on a knife switch, presses a button or hits the most common switch can say that not only current flows the strands of wire, but there also pulses the energy of the courage of people, who are doing everything to return the Chernobyl AES to operation.

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## MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

### PARTY ORGANIZATIONS CRITICIZED FOR LACK OF 'OPENNESS'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 86 (signed to press 19 Jun 86) pp 66-71

[Article by Maj S. Voronkov, regimental party committee secretary: "The Mobilizing Force of Openness"]

[Text] A regimental party meeting examined the question of the personal example of Communists in military training, military discipline and the observance of moral norms. This was not the first time that it was placed on the agenda. But this time the discussion was more thorough and frank, and truly cut people to the quick. This was largely true because both the speaker and those who took part in the discussions completely excluded from their lexicon the notorious "sometimes," "here and there," "individual comrades..." If they talked about violations they mentioned the names of those guilty. If they named shortcomings they analyzed in detail why they became possible and how to avoid them in the future. In short, the meeting was successful. This was felt from the reaction of the Communists. They did not immediately depart. They exchanged opinions, and expressed their complete agreement with the sharp, principled criticism made toward Maj V. Gorbovich, Sr Lt Ye. Karatayev and other comrades. All of this, naturally, could not help but cause entirely understandable satisfaction. At the same time, questions also arose. Why were these names mentioned only at the regimental meeting? And why by supervisors? Why were the errors and omissions of these Communists given just as clear and unambiguous an assessment earlier in the party organizations where they are enrolled? The answer is obvious. There is still not enough frankness, principle and demandingness toward one another in relations among Communists.

It was stated directly at the 27th CPSU Congress. The light of openness is uncomfortable to those who are accustomed to working in a slipshod manner. And the specific requirement was put forth to make openness a constantly operating system. In it the party seized the start point of the psychological restructuring of cadres and the guarantee that people's attitude toward their work will be permeated with a feeling of responsibility.

I have frequently seen myself that openness is a very effective means. This is especially true in cases involving violations of party and military discipline, unconscientiousness and neglect of one's duties. But it would be



incorrect to reduce it merely to the detection of shortcomings. It is a broader concept. Most of all it presumes the creation of an environment of free and businesslike exchange of opinions in the party organization. When Communists are always knowledgeable of the questions which the party committee and party buro is resolving, when people listen to their voice and when, finally, the activists themselves constantly take an interest in the opinions of party members, consider their suggestions and are attentive to their initiatives, then the party organization will truly live a healthy, full-blooded life and its influence will be felt in the affairs of the military collective.

Unfortunately, frequently examples of another type are also encountered in the work of the party organization. Not all subunits fulfilled their Socialist commitments in the past training year. Both the party committee and the battalion party buros share the blame for this, as was stated frankly at the regimental electoral meeting. They were not able to mobilize the Communists and all personnel completely to accomplish the tasks which faced them. They were not able to do so because they frequently operated apart from the people and their organizational work with them was weak. This is true although acute and urgent questions were raised in a timely manner at party meetings and sessions of the party committee and buro, good decisions were made and voluminous plans were compiled.

For example, this took place when the state of military discipline worsened in the subunits where Warrant Officer V. Kudryavtsev and Senior Warrant Officer A. Danduyev are the party organization secretaries. The party committee assigned the officer-Communists of the headquarters responsible for the situation in these collectives to look into the causes and assist the party organizations correct the indoctrination work being carried out with the personnel. The plans they outlined were good ones. However, it was hard to count on their successful implementation. Why? Not all the members of the party buro of the administration where this question was discussed were present at the party buro meeting. Maj A. Alenshintsev, the secretary, hastily and superficially informed both those who were absent and those directly responsible for fulfilling the plan. And the Communists of the subunits on whose shoulders the main burden fell were not informed at all about the resolution. It turned out that only one of its points was carried out: CPSU member R. Ibragimov was brought to party accountability for shortcomings in indoctrination of his subordinates. He was to be brought to accountability, and he was so brought. But, in the end, even this turned out to be a half measure. A principled discussion took place at the administration party buro session, but the Communists in the companies remained uninformed about specifically where their comrade had erred and in what way his work was unsatisfactory. Therefore, they were partly unable to examine critically their own affairs and conduct. It is entirely natural that a month later the Communists again had to return to the very same questions.

A lack of openness and clear information on the work of Communists is also characteristic of certain company party organizations which have from three to five CPSU members and candidate members on their roles. Checking showed that many decisions on important matters were made by secretaries alone, and non-party officers, warrant officers and junior commanders were not informed about

them. They were also rarely brought to light in meetings. It turned out that the party organization existed unto itself. The problems which troubled the Communists were not a cause of concern to all the personnel. The members of the party committee operating in the company where Warrant Officer G. Knyazev is party organization secretary confronted this situation. The Communists saw shortcomings in equipment maintenance and indoctrination work with people, discussed them with concern at the meetings, criticized one another, but the matter did not move off of dead center. It became clear from conversations with warrant officers who were not party members or komsomol activists that they knew nothing at all about some party organization decisions and knew about others only through hearsay. Therefore, the assistance which they gave to the Communists was also insignificant.

The formalistic approach toward informing the personnel about current problems and the lack of organizational measures also affected the company's results in military training and the state of military discipline. And the Communists, even with the help of the party committee, did not immediately succeed in achieving a turning point in people's moods or in awakening their initiative and feeling of participation in the affairs of the subunit.

Broad openness in decisions and plans and constant, correct information about the activity of elective organs also creates the conditions necessary to improve control over the observance of norms of party life and helps to affirm an atmosphere of mutual demandingness and principles. And on the other hand, their absence gives rise to an environment which encourages various sorts of violations, neglect and a disdainful attitude toward the interests of the collective.

When CPSU member Capt A. Timchenko was asked to a party committee session and given a strict reprimand this was hardly unexpected by anyone in the subunit. It had come to the point that the officer had a listless attitude toward his direct duties, at times was absent from work without a valid reason and once did not come to a regimental party meeting. The Communists in his battalion could not help but know about this. But they took a wait and see attitude. They considered it awkward to criticize their leader and felt that this was what the party committee was for, so let it react to the problem. The party committee reacted. But here we made a serious mistake, the consequences of which were long felt. Out of a false sense of delicacy and fear of undermining for once and for all the already shaky authority of the officer, we did not inform the rank and file Communists about the measures taken. And immediately false rumors spread that anything is permissible, and the authority of the whole party organization was essentially put under attack.

It was necessary to correct our mistake immediately. At the next meeting we openly told the Communists about the decision made at the party session. For it was necessary to let not only Timchenko, but also certain other Communist leaders know that discipline in the party is uniform for all.

We openly discussed our shortcomings in ensuring openness and constantly informing Communists about the decisions made by the party committee at the party meeting where the results of the work of the 27th CPSU Congress and the tasks stemming from them were discussed. Today a great deal is being done in

order to affirm in the collective an atmosphere of free and frank exchange of opinions. Gradually a clear system for informing Communists about the life of the party organization and its ongoing and future tasks is taking shape. This is being implemented in the first place through the secretaries, with whom conferences and seminars are regularly conducted. Party committee members continuously report their decisions to the rank and file Communists and are regularly present at meetings in the battalions and companies. Communist leaders have also begun to work more at the lower levels. Communication with them noticeably expands people's field of vision, and helps them see ahead of time the main directions in their work and solve many problems on the spot.

Previously both the secretaries of the subunit party organizations and I did not pay too serious attention to informing Communists before a meeting about what had been done to implement decisions. We limited ourselves to listing the points of the plan, opposite which stood the annotation "fulfilled." It turned out that people follow our work attentively. And they expect an honest and detailed assessment about what could be done, what could not be done and why. Recently I was again able to see how important such discussion is. At one of the meetings the Communists directed the attention of the people's controllers, headed by Maj V. Volosnikov, to the increasingly frequent instances of violations of norms for rations. However, they did not listen to the criticism, a fact which was brought to the attention of the secretary. This report served as the reason for a sharp discussion at the meeting, not only about the work of the mess hall, but also about living and rest conditions of the personnel. Then both Officer Volosnikov and certain Communists leaders caught it for inattention to the needs of the troops. But most importantly, criticism and openness helped attract attention to an urgent problem and mobilize people to solve it.

The successes and failures and strong and weak aspects of Communists are more clearly apparent in the light of openness. It is the duty of the party organization patiently to indoctrinate CPSU members and candidate members, help them display their best qualities and rid themselves of their shortcomings. The firm practice of giving a party assessment of the activity of Communists at meetings of the regimental headquarters and battalion party organizations became a great help in this difficult matter. I will say directly that this innovation took root very slowly and with considerable difficulties. Even the criteria for the evaluation caused disputes, until finally we came to the unified opinion to evaluate the personal example set by party members in military and political training and the observance of military discipline, and the state of affairs in the area entrusted to them. In time another index, very important in my view, was added: how the comrade fulfills his party assignments.

But, nevertheless, this was not the main difficulty. Psychologically people turned out to be not entirely prepared to have their work and deeds subjected to critical discussion in the presence of all the Communists. At first there were frequent instances in which people took offense. And both the battalion party organization secretaries and I had to hear more than once: Why is all this necessary? Does not such practice undermine the authority of the Communists?



But, you see, true authority does not fear openness. We patiently explained this to the Communists. And at the same time we sought maximum objectivity in the evaluations. This markedly increased the work both of party committee members and secretaries of battalion party organizations. After all, before speaking from the rostrum at a meeting about the merits and shortcomings of an individual, his achievements and omissions, it is necessary to study attentively the situation in the subunit where he serves and to consult with his commander and other Communists.

It is true that at first we nevertheless did not venture to make a public assessment of the activity of certain officer Communists. This was based on the same considerations: Would it not undermine their authority? It happened that the 27th CPSU Congress warned against this: "...There are no leaders and must be none who are protected from party accountability."

Very soon life itself forced us to reject our customary stereotypes. Here is a specific example. Several months ago the unit command and party committee had serious grievances against Maj V. Nikulin. He paid little attention to questions of strengthening military discipline, worked little to improve his ideological and theoretical level and unwillingly took part in mass political work in the subunits. Of course, we could have limited ourselves to discussing this with him, eye to eye, as the saying goes. But, you see, the men saw the true state of affairs. And, truth to tell, they reacted badly to each instance when some Communists turned out to be outside of the zone of criticism. Giving a party assessment to the work of CPSU member V. Nikulin, we stated frankly that the comrade was not completely fulfilling his duties, set forth in the CPSU Charter. Did the authority of the Communist leader suffer from this? I can say with complete justification, not in the least. To the contrary, the fact that the officer accepted properly the criticism made of him, honorably acknowledged his shortcomings and did not try to shift them to others, added to his authority with his subordinates. And it served as a good example for them of how it is necessary to react to critical remarks.

Making a principled party assessment and listening to reports by CPSU members are effective measures. We see the importance of such practice most of all in that it helps to improve control over the observance of the norms of party life, the execution of decisions which have been made and the work of each CPSU member and candidate member. Communists are at the center of attention of the entire party organization. Moreover, all are involved in the implementation of control.

Openness of decisions and plans and open discussion of problems which arise are not aims in themselves. Their purpose is to increase people's activeness, make wider use of their collective experience and knowledge and inculcate a feeling of participation in the affairs of the collective. We saw this law long ago: The more often we appeal to Communists and non-party military personnel for advice and take an interest in their opinions, the more willingly they come up with their own proposals and initiatives.

Several months ago the question of the condition of equipment arose rather sharply in the regiment. The unit command and party committee did not conceal

the true situation, as had occurred at times in the past, but informed both Communists and non-party personnel in detail about the shortcomings and the measures which it planned to undertake. But it happened that for some period of time the party committee excluded from its sphere of influence the subunit where Officer A. Prikhodko serves. The settled opinion expressed was that all was well with the subunit. In fact, some vehicles there did not have all their equipment and equipment storage and maintenance was being conducted with violations of established regulations. Maj A. Kiimenkov helped disclose the shortcomings. He frequently visited this subunit and saw that its Communists were little concerned about the state of the combat vehicles and were not demanding toward one another. The officer reported his observations and specific proposal to the commander, who instructed that an inspection be made. The timely intervention of the command and party committee helped effectively eliminate the shortcomings.

This example is not unique. Having felt the growing interest of people in the problems with which the collective is living, we ourselves also began to improve our methods and stopped waiting for some proposal or another to be made to the party committee. Now, before bringing up certain questions at a session or meeting, we request that the Communists and non-party comrades express their views, recommendations and proposals. The material received in response is analyzed and generalized and makes it possible to make a correct and timely decision.

Now we frequently invite rank and file Communists to party committee sessions and battalion party bureau sessions. Their experience and knowledge help us to grasp the problem under discussion more thoroughly. We have also begun the practice of conducting open party meetings more frequently. In company party organizations, for example, komsomol activists and junior commanders are invited to almost all of these meetings. Participating on an equal basis in discussing the tasks facing the subunit, they pass through a good school of indoctrination and grasp more closely the affairs and concerns of their collective.

Recently it has been especially noticeable that people have begun to have more confidence in the party organization. And, as a result, there has been a more principled attitude in relationships among Communists and more criticism at the meetings. Previously people spoke mostly about shortcomings and not about those who were at fault. And it was extremely rare when one heard criticism "from the bottom up." At the last meeting we all felt that a turning point had taken place in people's frames of mind. They began to express their views more boldly and more firmly defend their positions. We were talking, in particular, about improving the training and materiel base. And from the rostrum was heard the placating thought that the existing shortcomings were the result of objective reasons. Officer V. Basalayev, a company commander, asked to speak. And he proved with good argumentation that both the unit command and the party committee had done far from everything by way of introducing new technical devices and more modern equipment into the training process, or to popularize the experience of their use. It was necessary for us to correct the situation right away.

I would like to emphasize here what, in my view, is an important detail. People watch very attentively how Communists leaders react to criticism. Does the man snub the idea and act as though the criticism never occurred, or does he frankly acknowledge it as justified. Much depends on this, most of all the very atmosphere in our party house. And it is very important to resist trivial self pride and not to fall into ambition, but to conduct an honest and frank discussion with people. I thought about this again after talking with Capt Yu. Toiskin. He came to the party committee with grievances that he felt he had been unfairly reproached. I admit that at first it was difficult to conceal my irritation. The day before we had explained in detail to the comrade his omissions in the organization of Socialist competition in his subunit, but he did not want to understand. But I restrained myself in time. I felt that if he were turned back from the gates, as it were, the next time he would not speak frankly, but conceal his resentment. The discussion was not easy. But, nevertheless, we came to a mutual understanding.

The 27th CPSU Congress posed the task of ensuring full-blooded life in each party organization, characterized by frankness and openness of plans and decisions, humanity and mutual demandingness. This is not an easy task and is not planned for a single day. And the party has tested the way to accomplish it. It is to seek to ensure that not a single valuable thought and not a single critical remark is left unattended, and to inculcate collective responsibility and participation of each Communist in the overall affairs of the collective.

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## MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

### MAR LOSIK ON IMPERIALIST THREAT

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 86 pp 2-3

[Article by Marshal of Armored Troops O. A. Losik, Hero of the Soviet Union, 27th CPSU Congress Delegate: "Socialism is Invincible"]

[Excerpts] With this issue our journal initiates a new rubric: "Military Political Discussions of ZNAMENOSSETS on 27th CPSU Congress Policy." Congress delegates will take part in these discussions. Their purpose is to help warrant officers, sergeants and petty officers understand more thoroughly the essence of this turning point in the life of our society and their place in the struggle to fulfill the decisions of the party and to strengthen further the defense capability of the country.

Today our readers will meet with Marshal of Armored Troops O. Losik, Hero of the Soviet Union. Oleg Aleksandrovich has served in the army since 1935. He was a participant in the Soviet-Finnish War and the Great Patriotic War. He commanded a division, corps, army and the troops of the Far Eastern Military District. Today he is chief of the Military Academy of Armored Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy.

"No, the imperialists will never achieve superiority over us in military affairs. Socialism is insurmountable here as well. But we have never striven and do not strive for superiority in weapons over the U. S. and its allies. This was stated from the rostrum of the 27th Congress. The imperialists have always been and remain the initiators of the arms race. The Soviet Union has been forced to react appropriately and, as is known, has always found a worthy response. 'A historic achievement of Socialism,' it is written in the new edition of the CPSU Program, 'was the establishment of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the U. S., and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. This solidified the position of the USSR, the Socialist countries and all progressive forces and frustrated the plans of the aggressive imperialist circles for victory in a world nuclear war.' Preserving this equality is a major factor in ensuring peace and international security.

"In the past 41 years the threat of world war has repeatedly hung over the world. The United States has frequently nurtured plans for a nuclear attack against our country. And if imperialism has not yet resolved to realize these



plans, this is most of all because the military and economic might of Socialism and our state, and fear of an inevitable retaliatory strike restrains it.

"Today imperialism is remaking its predatory plans, improving the organization of its armed forces, intensively deploying ground, air and sea based strategic offensive forces and developing weapons based on new physical principles. Entire areas of the world, thousands of kilometers distant from the U. S. are declared its 'zone of national interests.' So called 'rapid deployment forces' are actively training for predatory attacks in these places. The Reagan Administration is making incredible efforts to implement its 'strategic defense initiative,' which envisions the deployment of strike weapons in space.

"But here as well they will not catch us unawares. We remember well the lessons of the past war. Our Socialist power has inexhaustible intellectual and production potential. The delegates to the 27th CPSU Congress greeted with applause the statement by MSU S. L. Sokolov, USSR Minister of Defense: 'If we are again forced to do so, an effective response from our side will also be found to space weapons.'

"Lenin's postulate about the aggressive essence of imperialism as the source of wars and military threats must not be forgotten. The intrigues of the U. S. administration and its military provocations daily convince us of this. It is necessary to remember constantly that military affairs are continuously developing and the requirements for combat readiness and for preparation of the Armed Forces are increasing. The decisions of the April 1985 Central Committee plenum, materials of the 27th CPSU Congress and party policy toward acceleration of scientific and technological progress all summon each of us, from soldier to marshal, to persistent and selfless labor.

"To learn that which is needed in war, continuously improve military skills under conditions as close as possible to those of combat, devote special attention to strengthening the martial qualities and discipline of the troops, their physical training and ability and capability to overcome the difficulties of modern warfare -- that is our task. It is necessary to give to its accomplishment all our efforts, all our energy and all the fire in our hearts.

"I remember at the front, in the midst of the most bloody battles, when the earth burned, metal melted and strength seemed to have left us, exhausted by innumerable attacks, when we told ourselves: 'It is not true that the line of defense runs as shown on the operation maps and the boundaries of strongpoints -- it runs through one's heart. As long as it is beating, as long as one is breathing, the enemy will not pass. You are invincible, you are a soldier...'

"Today we live in another time. But the invincibility of our platoons, companies, battalions and regiments, and the insurmountability of our Socialist country, just as during the war years, begins with each of us. It begins with a sense of personal responsibility for what takes place around us.

"It is with pride that I meet in the auditorium of the academy its students, captains Konstantin Sheyanov, Georgiy Kudinov and Ilyu Osipov, and Sr Lt Vasiliy Beshan, who were awarded one or even two Orders of the Red Star for their feats on Afghan soil. Looking at them I think that the front line heroes have worthy replacements. I sign with gladness orders about incentive awards for warrant officers who are capably supporting the training process in the faculties, communists Vladimir Belorybkin, Viktor Romanov, Valeriy Gorodnichin and Yuriy Furashov, and Great Patriotic War participant Nikolay Yashchuk. I know that they are among those who are able to take responsibility on themselves for the state of affairs in their areas of endeavor, who do not retreat in the face of difficulties, but conquer them.

"Our army is strong with such people. Comparing themselves to them, our soldiers mature. The soldiers' formation grows strong.

"Socialism is invincible. The sons and grandsons of front line soldiers, heirs of their spiritual richness, glory and traditions, stand guard over its accomplishments."

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## MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

### MAJ GEN BRUZ REVIEWS PRINCIPLES OF UNITY OF ARMY, PEOPLE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 86 (Signed to press 19 Jun 86) pp 51-57

[Article by Maj Gen Avn V. Bruz, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "The Great Force of the Unity of the Army and People"]

[Excerpts] The flesh and blood of the people, and its child, the Armed Forces of our country have always lived and do live one life with them and have one and the same interests and aspirations. The origin and strengthening of this inseparable unity, one of the historic achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution, is an objective process and a most important law of the functioning and development of the army of a Socialist state and of increasing its military might.

At the present stage of the perfection of Socialism the monolithic unity of army and people acquires still greater importance. This is due to the greater difficulty in defending socialism caused by the increasing aggressiveness of the policy of imperialist circles and the nature and scale of the tasks posed to the Soviet people and its Armed Forces by the 27th CPSU Congress.

The Communist Party realizes continuous leadership over military organizational development and the army and navy, which is the basic foundation for strengthening the defense of the Socialist homeland. It considers it necessary, as the new edition of the CPSU Program states, to ensure that in the future as well the blood tie between the army and people becomes still stronger. Every Communist and every Soviet man is obligated to do everything in his purview to maintain the defense capability of the country at the necessary level.

The armed forces of the Socialist states, which are truly popular by nature and composition, are called upon to defend the interests of the working class and all the workers, and are strong in their organic and indissoluble link with the people. V. I. Lenin always considered their unity to be one of the most important principles of Soviet military organizational development and the source of the defense might of the proletarian republic and of the invincibility of its armed forces. "The army and people must merge," he emphasized, "-- this is the victory of freedom!" (Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy [Complete Works], Vol 31, p 243). Lenin saw the unity of the people and army

as one of the greatest achievements of the October Revolution and as a historic achievement of Socialism.

The truly democratic nature of the Soviet Armed Forces and their monolithic unity with the people are confirmed by the whole history of our homeland, and by the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Socialist fatherland. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and with the active support of the broad masses of workers, the young Red Army defeated the combined forces of internal counterrevolution and foreign military intervention. The unity of our army and people, led by the party, was displayed still more vividly in the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War.

The victories in the fiercest clashes with the strike forces of imperialism convincingly demonstrated the invincible stability of the unity of army and people, which links the Armed Forces of the Land of the Soviets and the workers by inseparable ties. A part of the people, living one life with it, the Soviet Armed Forces assimilate all of the social relations of society and are structured, function and are developed according to its laws. However, this does not take place accidentally or automatically, but under the purposeful and systematic influence of CPSU policy. Guided by Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, the party knows the laws of armed conflict and scientifically foresees the developmental tendencies of military affairs. This enables it to define correctly the main directions for the organizational development of the army and the special features of its preparation at each specific historic stage.

As is emphasized in the new edition of the Party Program, the CPSU considers it necessary to continue in the future to strengthen its organizing and directing influence on the life and activity of the Armed Forces. It sees tirelessly safeguarding and strengthening the unity of army and people, which is a necessary condition for raising the defense might of the state, as one of its most important tasks. Implementing the plans outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress for purposeful and all-round perfection of Socialism and further advance of Soviet society toward Communism through acceleration of the country's social and economic development, helps strengthen this unity at this time.

The economic basis for the close unity of the army with all the workers is becoming ever stronger. The structural transformation of social production and acceleration of scientific and technological progress which are being implemented today make it possible to improve the material and technological base of the Armed Forces and their equipping with modern military equipment and weapons. The troops and naval forces have missiles for the most varied purposes, powerful armored equipment, mighty artillery, all-weather aircraft and modern submarines and surface ships. Everyday living conditions and the food and clothing supply of the troops are being steadily improved.

The 27th Party Congress emphasized that "...an increase in the rates and absolute growth of national income is necessary in order to solve large scale economic and social tasks simultaneously. It is also necessary to maintain the defense capability of the country at the required levels." In the coming



years complete supply of the Soviet Armed Forces with everything necessary for the defense of the homeland is planned.

The influence of economic achievements on strengthening the ties between the army and people is also manifested in another, no less important aspect. Everything which is created through the labor of the Soviet people and all the riches of our country are the property of the whole society, our state and its citizens. The full scale struggle by the party for strict observance of the principle of social justice in the distribution of material and spiritual benefits, and improving on this basis the well-being of all who conscientiously labor, help to solidify the unity of the people, the political stability of the society, and increased activeness and responsibility on the part of the builders of Socialism and its defenders.

The theoretical, political and practical importance of the instructions of the 27th CPSU Congress is great on such problems as improving the interrelationships of classes, social groups, nations and nationalities, and further democratization of our society. Implementation of the measures envisioned by the Congress for strengthening the alliance of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia and the friendship among the peoples of the USSR; consistent and steady development of Socialist worker self-management; and the increasing activeness of soviets and trade union and komsomol organizations are creating ever wider opportunities for accelerating solutions to economic and social tasks and strengthening the defense capability of the country.

Along with increasing their labor contribution to raising the defense capability of the state, the Soviet people are participating ever more actively in military-patriotic and mass defense work in enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhoses, organizations and institutions.

Through the joint efforts of party, soviet, trade union, komsomol and other social organizations, educational organs and labor collectives, ever more effective measures are being taken in our country to prepare young people thoroughly for army service. DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy of the USSR] is playing a special role in this.

The implementation of additional measures planned by the recently approved CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution will help to improve further the training of the young replacements for the Armed Forces. These measures are aimed at raising the level of military-patriotic indoctrination of young people and their physical tempering, and improving medical and health work.

A meeting held on 3 June of this year by leaders of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, with the leaders of creative unions and organizations and prominent literary and artistic figures was devoted to the problem of increasing the activeness of military and patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet people. Ways of increasing the role of creative workers and the mass information media in

solving this vitally important task at the present stage of development of our society were discussed at the meeting.

The growing unity of the people and army is vividly manifested in the traditional patronage of the workers over military units and ships. There are more and more labor collectives which maintain close contacts with subunits where their fellow villagers or former comrades at work are serving. Besides correspondence and an exchange of delegations, new forms of communications are also emerging and entering into practice. In particular, portraits of outstanding servicemen in military and political training are being placed on the Honor Boards of enterprises, along with portraits of leading producers. Joint summing up of the results of Socialist competition, sharing of experience and sports competition are also being practiced.

The unity of the army and the people are also being strengthened in that, along with accomplishing their main tasks, servicemen assist the workers as required in solving various economic problems. Soviet troops made a great contribution to the building of the Baykal-Amur Main Line, for which many received orders and medals. Five were awarded the high title, Hero of Socialist Labor. The personnel of motor transport elements take part each year in harvesting. Soldiers are first to come to the aid of the population during floods, fires, earthquakes and other disasters.

The monolithic nature of our society and the inseparable unity of the people and the Armed Forces, a fortress of labor and military traditions, is being manifested fully today during the course of eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power plant]. Shoulder to shoulder with civilian specialists, military medical personnel, helicopter pilots, chemical troops, engineers and representatives of other military specialties are operating selflessly there with civilian specialists.

The unity of army and people is vividly manifested in that military servicemen, like all Soviet people, take an active part in the social and political life of the country. They enjoy all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the USSR Constitution, including the right to elect and be elected to all organs of state government, from top to bottom. It is enough to say that at present 55 Armed Forces representatives are deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 162 are deputies of the supreme soviets of the union republics and thousands are deputies of local soviets.

For the purpose of increasing the activeness and effectiveness of military-patriotic indoctrination of children and adolescents, as the CPSU Central Committee recommended in its resolution, "On Measures to Improve the Use of Clubs and Sports Facilities," clubs for young sailors, pilots, parachutists, cosmonauts, assault troops and border troops, and defense sport camps are being organized in cities and rayons with the assistance of representatives of military units. Army and navy cultural, educational and sports institutions are being used ever more effectively for the training of pre-draft age and draft-age youth.

Meetings between soldiers and workers representing related professions -- communications troops, repair troops, motor transport troops, as well as

inventors and rationalizers -- are of great importance in indoctrination. In some garrisons special days are set up for meetings by patrons of military units, ships and military educational institutions. Talks at seminars with non-organic army propagandists by scientists, managers of enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and production innovators have become widespread.

At the same time, there remain many reserves for improving the patronage ties with labor collectives in the work of commanders, political organs and party organizations of units, ships and military training institutions. These ties must be constant factors in the mutual indoctrination influence of the workers and the armed defenders of the homeland.

The 27th CPSU Congress, which outlined a grand program for further improving Socialist society, substantiated the objective need for strengthening the defense might of the USSR and for improving the security of the country and readiness of the Armed Forces to defeat any aggressor, defined in this process the main tasks and ways to solve them successfully. The congress stressed the importance of constantly strengthening the blood tie between the army and people, which represents one of the fundamental Leninist principles of Soviet military organizational development. The beneficial effect of our society on the army and navy, and steady growth of their combat effectiveness and combat readiness depend to a tremendous extent on the persistent and consistent implementation of this principle.

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## MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

### COLONEL GENERAL POPKOV ON IMPROVING PRE-DRAFT TRAINING

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 16, Aug 86 (Signed to Press 30 Jul 86)  
pp6-7

[Interview by SOVETSKIY VOIN correspondent of Colonel General Mikhail Danilovich Popkov, chief of the Political Administration, Ground Forces: "Readiness to 'Fall In'"]

[Text] In the life of each youth, worker, kolkhoz peasant and student in a technical school or institute there comes the day he remembers his whole life, when he puts on his first military uniform and listens to the first order given to him to fall-in.

His young voice rings out in answer: "Yes sir, fall-in!"

Young soldiers differ little from one another in their outward appearance. With what "baggage" did they enter the army? To what extent are they prepared to solve successfully the tasks which military service will place before them? This is what our discussion is about.

Colonel General Mikhail Danilovich Popkov, chief of the Ground Forces Political Administration, Military Soviet member, answers the questions of the journal's correspondent.

Question. I would like, Comrade Colonel General, to begin with the recently approved CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution on further improving the training of young people for military service. Tell us, please, about the importance of this resolution.

Answer. First it is important to emphasize that the entire life of the Soviet people and its soldiers is today permeated with an intense working rhythm to fulfill the historic decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. The Soviet people must accomplish the grand tasks of accelerating social and economic development under conditions of a complex and explosive international environment, caused by the growing aggressiveness of the imperialist circles. That is why our party and the Soviet government must tirelessly strengthen the country's defense, maintain the highest vigilance and pay constant, most careful attention to the army and navy, to improving their military capability

and readiness to deal an immediate and crushing rebuff to any aggressor. "With full responsibility we can today state," emphasized Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, in the political report of the party Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Congress, "that the defense might of the USSR is being maintained at a level which reliably defends the peaceful labor and peaceful life of the Soviet people."

A new manifestation of the concern for improving the military might of the USSR Armed Forces was the recently approved resolution by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, aimed at further improving the training of young people for military service. It is well known that in recent years the level at which the army and navy are equipped technically has risen substantially. Let us refer to the influence of scientific and technological achievements on the qualitative training of young people for military service. The rapid rates of scientific and technological progress have led to a situation in which during the past 10-15 years alone 2 or 3 generations of complex modern equipment have been replaced and a substantial portion of the combat aircraft, tanks, armored personnel carriers, surface ships and submarines have been modernized. This is an objective process. Today the majority of soldiers require thorough technical knowledge. Without exaggeration I can say that frequently junior commanders -- sergeants and master sergeants -- need knowledge at the level of a technician, and a significant portion of the officers, at that of an engineer.

The nature of military work has changed and its intensiveness and intensity have substantially grown. The operation of complex apparatuses, equipment and weapons during the course of military watch, lengthy voyages, flights, and in accomplishing other military training missions has made new and higher demands on the moral and military qualities of the troops, and most of all on their consciousness, self discipline and knowledge of military affairs.

All of this undoubtedly increased the importance of the training of pre-draft age and draft-age youth for service in the USSR Armed Forces while they are still, as we say, on the distant approaches to the military formation.

The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers is also aimed at further improving this great work of national importance. By this resolution party, soviet, trade union and komsomol organs, and appropriate ministries and departments are tasked to take additional steps to improve the level of pre-draft training of young people and their physical tempering, improve health work and develop military and patriotic indoctrination. The measures outlined by the resolution have as their goal ensuring that the army and navy are manned with young replacements who are prepared to fulfill their duty of defending the socialist fatherland and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people in a worthy manner.

Question. As we see, the training of young people for service must be conducted in good time and on many planes. As this applies to the Ground Forces, for what must the draftee be prepared?

Answer. I can say that service is worthy and crucial in any of our Armed Services and branches of arms. It requires from every youth who is preparing

to enter the army ranks high ideological tempering, great devotion to the party and people and profound consciousness of personal responsibility for the defense of the homeland and for fulfilling his patriotic and international duty.

No matter in what capacity a soldier or sailor serves -- tanker, artilleryman, submariner, missileman, signalman or in the chemical troops -- he needs to possess high social activeness and a developed intellect, to be well informed and to possess the ability to reach correct conclusions in a complex military and political environment. Most importantly, at any position he must be prepared to fulfill his military duty in an exemplary fashion.

All of these qualities are also very important for service in the Ground Forces. Of course, this service has its own specifics. In recent years the Ground Forces have changed fundamentally. Young soldiers work with the most varied weapons and equipment. In our units and large units there are powerful operational-tactical and tactical missiles and the latest tanks and artillery. And today there is no longer the infantry, which during the Great Patriotic War was lovingly called the "Queen of the Battlefield," but there are motorized rifle troops. They are completely motorized and covered by armor. It is enough to say that a motorized rifle division has hundreds of tanks, BMPs and armored personnel carriers, and a large quantity of motor vehicles. The weight of a volley of fire has increased ten-fold, compared to the period of the past war.

Service in the Ground Forces today is also associated with standing military watch and with many days of field exercises. The troops must learn military affairs under very difficult conditions, in mountains and mountainous desert terrain, and conduct lengthy marches and trips of many kilometers.

Every youth must also be prepared to fulfill his international duties. Today everyday military life requires an excellent level of military training, a high degree of physical preparation and a soldier's keenness and decisiveness.

It is precisely these valuable qualities which assisted soldier-internationalist Msgt Viktor Kapshuk to display his abilities fully. In solving difficult missions and in clashes with the Dushman [Afghan Rebels] (of which he has had many) he operated competently and prudently. For his exemplary fulfillment of his military and international duty in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] Viktor Kapshuk was awarded the high title Hero of the Soviet Union. I can also give this example. Aleksandr Kovalev received good tempering in the labor collective and in the Minsk DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces] school. His service in one of the subunits located in the DRA was marked by high state awards of the Order of the Red Star and by medals "For Valor" and "For Combat Services."

The future soldier must prepare in advance. He must prepare thoroughly, in all respects. On the moral plane he must prepare to be obedient to his commanders and supervisors and be disciplined, strong of purpose, precise and punctual. In the general educational respect he must persistently become proficient in the fundamentals of the sciences and have firm military-technical training. And, of course, the army requires strong muscles. The

law here is that the higher the level of all-round preparation of young people for military service, the more quickly the young generation will, as we say, join the rhythm of army life.

Question. And what thrust, Comrade Colonel General, is most important and of first priority in your view?

Answer. It is difficult to place priority on one or several thrusts in the training of young people for army service. All are interconnected and important in their own way.

But I would place the ideological tempering of the future soldier at the forefront; his spiritual mobilization and readiness for difficult daily military labor. This labor requires tremendously intense moral and physical forces and full output of one's abilities, and does not know breaks and days off. Already in peacetime military service places the soldier in conditions close the those of combat and does not permit a lackadaisical or light attitude toward his work. And it is good when every youth understands thoroughly that military labor, in its social importance, is inseparable from the labor of a worker, kolkhoz peasant, scientist or that of all the Soviet people.

And as practice shows, this labor brings the greatest return and fully serves the cause of improving the combat readiness of units and subunits under conditions of high cohesiveness of military collectives, and the self-discipline and discipline of every soldier and sailor. Back in the first "Service Pamphlet of the Red Army Soldier," published at the initiative of V.I. Lenin, it is written: "Be precise and correct in fulfilling orders. Enter military affairs with your whole heart..."

It is very important for the family, school and labor collective, before army service, to inculcate and develop in young fellows such qualities as collectivism, comradeship, mutual assistance, purposefulness, a high degree of organization and self discipline.

Question. Who, what state and public organizations, conduct or must conduct this great work of preparing youth for service in the country's Armed Forces? Based on an analysis of the service of soldiers called up from various regions of our country, could you name to some extent the leading oblasts and cities, where constant and marked attention is paid to military and patriotic training?

Answer. In our country an orderly system for preparing young people for army service has taken shape and is in operation. Based on party requirements, local party and soviet organs and public organizations, in close cooperation with military soviets and commanders, political organs and military commissariats, are carrying out a great deal of work toward indoctrinating young people in the spirit of a proper understanding of their sacred duty to the homeland and constant readiness to come to its defense.

Far beyond the Volga the experience of military and patriotic indoctrination of future soldiers in the home of Lenin -- the city of Ulyanovsk and Ulyanovsk



Oblast -- is known. The oblast party committee coordinates this work and it is directly implemented by a working group of the party obkom, headed by one of its secretaries. The memorial places and traditions associated with the life of V. I. Lenin and the most rich material collected in the Lenin Memorial are widely used. Twice a year, in spring and fall, young draftees receive the mandate of their fellow citizens within the walls of this majestic complex to serve the homeland worthily, as the great Lenin willed. Mass sports competitions and holidays, gatherings of draftees and evening get-togethers devoted to the "mandate of the motherland" are regularly conducted in the oblast. All of this work is carried out in close contact with the political administration of the Volga Military District and with the oblast military commissariat.

Ulyanovsk residents maintain close ties with the military units where their soldier-neighbors are serving, and know their army doings well. These ties are widely used in indoctrinating young people. The patronage of Ulyanovsk citizens with soldiers of the Samaro-Ulyanovsk, Berdichev Iron Motorized Rifle Division and sailors on the Ulyanovskiy Komsomolets submarine was enriched with new facets.

The best people in the oblast are sent to serve in these glorious military collectives. And they justify the high trust of their fellow citizens with honor. For example, Private Nikolay Baybikov rapidly mastered his military specialty and is rated excellent in military and political training. Komsomol activist Private Aleksandr Ryabov is always first to be entrusted to accomplish exercises on combat vehicle driving. The squad commanded by Jr Sgt Yuriy Okhotin is among the best in the subunit.

I have visited the Ulyanovsk citizens many times. Each time I see that true party concern is manifested with respect to the indoctrination of young people and their training for military service, which engenders creative initiative and new, most effective, non-stereotyped approaches toward this important and responsible matter. And it is a positive development that much from the experience of the Ulyanovsk Party Obkom is being introduced in other places.

I would like to stress the important role played by military instructors in schools and vocational and technical schools in training future soldiers. Much depends on whom the training of young people for future service is entrusted. Today the majority of military instructors are reserve officers, but we also have our "gold fund" of Great Patriotic War veterans. And it is proper when the candidatures of military instructors are examined in the party organs, which increases the authority and responsibility of this category of pedagogical cadres. This is precisely what takes place in Tula Oblast, which is clearly among the better oblasts in the organization of defense work and of work with the teachers of future soldiers themselves.

Experience confirms that soldiers discharged into the reserves are reliable assistants in the matter of patriotic indoctrination. Many of them, having served their terms of service, are actively involved in work with pre-draft age youth and conduct technical circles and sports sections in schools and SPTU [rural vocational schools].

The school is taking on ever increasing importance in military and patriotic indoctrination. Party documents on school reform define an extensive, scientifically based program for this work.

Patriotic indoctrination of young people is also being conducted purposefully and actively in other cities, oblasts and republics, most of all in Moscow City, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Smolensk and Volgograd oblasts and the Maritime Kray.

In conclusion I would like to return to the beginning of our conversation and emphasize that the recently approved CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council Ministers resolution will undoubtedly improve our coordination with local party and Soviet organs in the military and patriotic indoctrination of young people, which will enable this work to be more specific and purposeful, without the window dressing and disorganization which sometimes still exist.

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## MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

### MILITARY LIFE LEADS TO BREAK WITH RELIGION

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 16, Aug 86 (signed to press 30 Jul 86)  
p45

[Article by Captain L. Orekhov: "Insight"]

[Text] Dear Editors!

Subunit komsomol activists Sergeant Strelkov, privates Bibik and Fomchenko, and PFC Yanushevich are writing this letter to you. Recently the new replacements arrived at our unit. On the whole they are good lads, hard working and responsive. They successfully completed the course for the young soldier and are now persistently mastering their military specialties. We, as junior commanders and the company aktiv, assist them as they get started. But we are confronted with this for the first time and, frankly speaking, do not have a clear understanding of what to do about it. One of our new comrades is a believer. We are carrying out some work with him, but so far it is not having any results. We are not succeeding in making a gap in the wall of alienation and indifference behind which he hides from the collective. Perhaps you can give us some advice?"

That is the letter. It is atypical of the mail to the editors, but precisely for that reason it requires careful attention.

Below is published material by Capt L. Orekhov, entitled "Insight," which touches on the questions which so trouble the authors of the letter.

Private Deder is characterized in the subunit on the plus side as a disciplined soldier, courteous and correct, who will not say a bad word. But as soon as he has the opportunity he hurries to be alone. Would he like to go to the movie? I cannot go. Do you want to read an interesting book? I do not want to. Go to a meeting? I cannot. Work on Sunday? I must not, it is a holy day.

At first this caused amazement. Then concern.



"The man is perishing," Lt Snova, the political officer, told the company activists with unconcealed disquiet. "And we take no action."

"What do you mean take no action? Jr Sgt Kasymov attempted to justify himself. We had no fewer than ten conversations alone with him."

"Take no action!" private Kaus supported him. "Our words fly like peas against a wall."

"You are working in a one sided manner, comrade komsomol activists," stated the political officer reproachfully. "Here conversations alone do not work. Strive to see that Deder is not alone for a minute. Give him more responsible tasks. If he does not want to go to the movie, do not push him. You yourselves tell him the content of the film. He will not hold out and will break with his prejudice. This means that the fetters of religion will become weaker."

I recall this conversation, held in the Lenin Room, looked at Deder unhurriedly talking about himself, and the face of another soldier, private Timofey Lebedev, came into my memory.

His family were also all believers -- Seventh Day Adventists. When they gathered in the house of prayer his parents took Timofey with them. The curious boy was interested in hearing Biblical tales filled with miracles. However, in time fear of Christ's advent and the fearsome judgement of which his co-religionists unceasingly spoke more and more crept into his heart. And this fear still further strengthened his religious prejudices.

In school his comrades and teachers attempted to change Timofey's convictions, but religion had already sent its hellish roots into the heart of the lad and he paid no attention to the advice of his friends. True, one conversation held just prior to his graduation drove the first kernels of doubt into him.

After a history lesson conducted by his favorite teacher, Lebedev remained in class. A discussion about the past war and about the suffering which the Soviet people and peoples of Europe enslaved by fascism endured ensued between him and his teacher. Timofey learned for the first time that on the belt buckles of the Hitlerites was stamped: "God is with us!" With these belts they pitilessly tortured children, old men and women. They, "believers in God," shot peaceful people, burned them in crematoria and exterminated them in mobile gas chambers.

The conversation shook Timofey. Something touched his sensitive soul. But it was not enough. The religious potion was too strong for him to sober up immediately.

In the army Lebedev did everything a soldier was supposed to do and he worked conscientiously -- except for Saturday. In the Adventist sect this day was considered sacred. The stubbornness with which he followed this commandment was fortified by letters from home. But his commanders and comrades in service did not leave Timofey in trouble.

"Here. Read." Jr Sgt Vorontsov suggested to him one day.

Lebedev read the title of the book which Vorontsov handed to him and lifted his head in amazement:

"About atheism? It is...it is Godlessness."

"Yes, you read it. I read it at one sitting."

"And it is not sinful?"

"Don't worry about it!" Vorontsov calmed his friend with a smile.

Only out of respect for his comrade did Lebedev grudgingly read the book. Often he tore himself from the page and looked around on all sides, as if fearing the "omnipotent" eye of God. The next book he read avidly. Its title was symbolic: "We Broke With Religion." After this Lebedev began frequently to be seen in the unit library. There, on the bookshelves, he sought answers to the questions which troubled him.

In small steps Lebedev came to the light, to insight. And then one day something happened which sharply changed his destiny.

He was in his 10th month of service. Lebedev was called to the radio station one night. As an experienced signalman, he, along with his comrades, had to fix a "malfunction," which the inspector made, according to the concept of an exercise which was beginning. A little time was spent diagnosing the problem. Lebedev was first to find the "damaged" unit. The work proceeded feverishly, unceasingly.

The timid rays of the sun had barely touched the tops of the trees when the tired soldiers, straightening their field shirts enroute, left the station and lined up next to it.

"Lads, fellows," the usually strict, stingy with praise unit commander did not hold back his feelings. But then he gained control of himself and, having come to attention, expressed his gratitude to all the signalmen. And, therefore, to Lebedev also.

The formation went to the barracks. The smile did not leave Lebedev's face. Today turned out to be the happiest day of his life. And suddenly it was as though something pricked his heart. He remembered that today was Saturday. Lebedev listened to his feelings. No, there was no fear of "sacrilege." Around him the lads joined in a rousing round of "Katyusha," and he did not hold back. He thrust out his chest still farther and joined in: "Vykhodila, pesnyu zavodila pro stepnogo sizogo orla..."

That evening he wrote a letter home. He stated that he had broken forever with religion, that he was sad for his clouded childhood and for his lost time. "Son, come to your senses!" They admonished him. "I did come to my senses," answered Lebedev "and I wish that you would look at the world with clear eyes and you would see how beautiful it is."

Today Timofey Lebedev is a student at a military school, secretary of his class komsomol organization, and is married and raising a daughter. He found his happiness, his road in life.

And will Private Deder be able to find it? Will he be able to rid himself of the bonds of religion, which preach submissiveness to fate, passivity and disbelief in one's self?

Private Deder has taken the first, still timid steps. He has stopped avoiding his comrades, and understands that military labor has not known and will not know holy days. Therefore, he takes on any work on Sunday.

He is still far from full insight. But the help of his friends better than any medicine will rid private Deder of religious blindness.

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## MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

### LEAD EDITORIAL: IMPROVING COMBAT TRAINING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 86 (Signed to press 19 May 86) pp 3-8

[Editorial: "A New Qualitative Level for Summer Combat Training"]

[Text] The summer training period is underway in the Army and Navy. Personnel of units and ships have begun it with high political and businesslike enthusiasm, resulting from the historical decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. The party's policy towards accelerating social and economic development of the country and the requirement to work in a new manner and increase productivity and product quality is finding unanimous approval and warm support from the armed defenders of the homeland.

The appeal from the highest forum of Lenin's party--to turn the power of thought into the power of actions--is motivating commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, and all soldiers to achieve new success in combat and political training. A sound foundation for further increasing combat readiness and strengthening discipline was laid during the winter training period. The level of field, aerial, and naval training of the troops and naval forces, standing alert duty, mastering weapons and combat equipment, and management activities of staffs has increased. A considerable amount of experience has been gained in many military collectives in improving weapon, tactical, technical, and special training.

Personnel of the outstanding missile unit commanded by Lt Col T. Mayakov carried out the tasks of the winter training period with high quality. The unit was the initiator of socialist competition in the Strategic Rocket Forces. The commander, his deputy for political affairs, and the party organization concentrated their main efforts on increasing personal responsibility of individuals for their assignments, actively searching for new reserves for intensifying the training and education process, and ensuring the leading role of communists and Komsomol members in combat and political training. Here in the course of the training process they managed to see that soldiers' skills increased from training session to training session, that not a single training session was simplified, and that each combat training mission was carried out effectively, completely, and in a situation as close as possible to actual combat. Also very important is the fact that the party organization's exactingness towards communists for quality of combat training

has taken on greater specificity. All this also helped the unit successfully fulfill its socialist commitments made for the winter training period.

The past training period also showed that not all military collectives carried out completely and with high quality the plans and programs of combat and political training and that there are still instances of formalism and being used to outdated work methods. Some communist leaders advocate in words restructuring and talk about it profusely, but do little to actually restructure their activities and see that the organization of combat training is exemplary and effective and that coordination of management work is irreproachable at all levels and the end results of efforts expended are high.

For example, what prevented personnel of Lt Col G. Karpov's regiment from completely fulfilling their socialist commitments made for the winter training period? The primary reasons were that the communist leaders did not demonstrate the necessary organizer qualities, often did not see the importance in their work, and did not see things through to the end. Individual subunit commanders resigned themselves to formalism in the training process and in socialist competition. The party organization also had little influence on the collective's achievement of high end results in military labor. The decisions of the party committee and party meetings aimed at increasing the personal contribution of communists in improving weapon, technical, and tactical training and strengthening discipline were not always carried out. The gap between words and deeds in party activities also resulted in the need for restructuring being stated, but everything essentially remained as before.

This sort of shortcoming is also typical of the work style of a number of other party organizations. It must be decisively overcome. Otherwise, one cannot count on high end results.

A comprehensive, thorough analysis of the winter training period results and the state of affairs in military collectives is a necessary prerequisite for intensifying the efficacy of work for increasing combat readiness and strengthening discipline and bringing it in complete conformity with the requirements of the 27th Party Congress. Today, military councils, commanders, political bodies, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations must be able to develop actively that positive experience which was amassed in the winter training period and struggle with everything that impedes accelerated progress and reorganization. They need to assess self-critically what has been achieved, draw practical conclusions from the mistakes made, and see to it that the work of command and political cadres and party and Komsomol organizations is structured taking into account the increased demands of the party and the directions of the USSR Council of Ministers and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy on increasing the quality of training and education of personnel.

The USSR minister of defense requires that combat training become the basis of the troops' vital activities. The entire structure of the training and service of personnel must be subordinated to it everyday, and those who squander precious training time be held strictly accountable. Every military collective must demonstrate a vital concern that the principle--training time



is for training--become an immutable law which is to be explicitly observed by everyone. This can be achieved only if commanders, political bodies, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations cultivate a high personal responsibility of officials for qualitative fulfillment of plans and programs of combat and political training. This is where the primary efforts must be concentrated in organizational and educational work.

As before, the primary principle in field, airborne, and naval training of soldiers is to teach the troops what is necessary in war. This means that the entire content of the training process should be strictly subordinated to cultivating in personnel a complete readiness for immediate actions and the ability to wage battle effectively and that commanders, political workers, and staffs are obliged to take into account the new trends in military affairs when planning the training process. This means that it is necessary to cultivate in soldiers the ability to conduct highly mobile and decisive actions in any situation and in conditions of an enemy's use of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. At classes, exercises, training sessions and during flights and cruises it is necessary to create a tactical situation and conditions which would correspond as much as possible to actual combat. It is important to model extreme situations and impel personnel to act with extremely limited time and under heavy psychological pressure, simultaneously striving to see that servicemen skillfully master the weapons and equipment, effectively use them, and are capable of gaining victory in battle not by numbers but by skill.

The struggle for quality in military training begins back at its planning phase. It must be optimal and take into account all factors ensuring effective combat work. It is necessary decisively to put an end to instances where the plans are overloaded and unrealistic, and where their fulfillment is poorly organized or unplanned measures are substituted for planned ones. Taking into account the modern requirements on troop training, it is necessary to identify the principal directions in training and education of personnel, provide for successive completion of tasks, efficiently distribute training time, motor transport resources, ammunition, and fuel, clarify a procedure for using training resources and coordination of regimental and battalion plans and company training schedules, and see to it that the system of monitoring fulfillment of plans and programs makes it possible to eliminate any discrepancies and breakdowns in the training process. Staff officers have a special responsibility for this. They are called upon to search continually for new reserves for improving field, airborne, and sea training of personnel, actively influence increasing the competence of subordinate commanders in organizing and conducting battle, pass on to them their wealth of experience, strictly check on the achievements of units and subunits, and help people eliminate shortcomings.

In the summer training period the party organizations of the staffs are to concentrate their main efforts on improving the work style of communist in the supervisory ranks and on increasing their personal responsibility for the state of affairs in their assigned sections. The essence of restructuring in the activities of staff communists should be that maximum consideration is given at all levels to factors dictated by the complexity of the situation and

changes in military affairs and that competent leadership is demonstrated everywhere and in everything.

Successful fulfillment of combat training plans and programs depends to a great extent on the professional training of instructors. Here priority is given above all to the need to increase the responsibility and skills of officers--the main organizers of training and education of subordinates. Experience confirms that qualitative resolution of any problem in the training and educational process begins precisely with the officers, who are obliged to conduct every activity on a high methodological level and see to it that it combines the cognitive, practical, and educational aspects. This can be achieved with well-organized, substantive commander training. It should not be a "repetition of what has been covered," but contribute to increasing the knowledge and practical skills of officers.

It is necessary to improve the work style of officers in every possible way, teach them to demonstrate initiative, creativity, and the ability to assume responsibility without looking back for prompting from superiors. Businesslike efficiency, competence, creative work, and the desire to achieve a high end result--this is what must characterize the style of today's officer-leader.

The training materials base is an important resource for qualitative practice of training tasks. It must completely meet the modern requirements for organization of the training process. It is necessary to use the achievement of scientific and technical progress in military affairs, creative thought, and the search for Army and Navy innovators to improve it.

Systematic and objective monitoring of plan and program fulfillment in units and subunits serves to ensure quality of summer combat training. Where staff officers and inspecting agency officers strive to see that during checks and control exercises, firings, and launches the level of training of personnel is evaluated with maximum accuracy, causes of identified shortcomings and those responsible are thoroughly disclosed, and specific practical steps are taken to eliminate the mistakes, the level of combat and political training rises. Reliable, thorough monitoring is an important tool in improving affairs in all military collectives and in intensifying the struggle with sham efficiency, eyewash, and complacency. In a number of units and subunits of the Northern Group of Forces, for example, instances of concealing serious deficiencies in combat training, discipline, and work style of personnel were noted. However, in documents sent to higher headquarters, certain communist-leaders pictured everything to be just fine. Only a thorough on-site inspection conducted by competent officials could clear up the muddled situation. Those who tried to cover it up were held strictly accountable.

Socialist competition under the motto "Let us carry out the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and reliably defend the achievements of socialism!" must become an integral, organic part of the training process. The main thing is to give it forms which would motivate people to make the most effective use of every training hour and intensively master equipment and weapons and would contribute to improving field, airborne, and sea training. The commander is the organizer of the competition. He is obligated to plan and conduct

activities so that a spirit of healthy competition among subordinates reigns. It is also important to see that the educational opportunities of the competition "work" more actively and that it contributes to the moral strengthening of the personality. It is necessary to give timely due to those who excel, find a more effective way to solve a given problem, and are able to give a hand to those lagging behind and to link word and deed together.

The complexity and volume of tasks of the summer training period require a further substantial restructuring in the work style of political bodies and party organizations. It is necessary to continue to strive for unity of organizational and ideological efforts in party work, aimed at resolving current and future problems directly in the units and subunits. More persistent efforts should be made to see that people are oriented toward achieving high end results, to render an active political influence on the quality of work of officer cadres, including supervisory personnel, and to educate everyone in a spirit of heightened responsibility for their assignments.

A key task of party-political work at this stage is to ensure the thorough study and practical fulfillment of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the instructions of the USSR Ministry of Defense on training the Armed Forces. It is the first duty of commanders, political bodies, political workers of units and subunits, and party and Komsomol activists to make every soldier thoroughly aware of the essence and spirit of the decisions made by the congress and to organize practical work to carry them out. It is important to exert continuous political influence on people's consciousness and make maximum use of the human factor.

Time imposes increased demands on the professional competency of political workers and on their ability, as they say, to be in control of the situation in military collectives, actively influence the political morale of people, and be truly close to them. Every political worker must be distinguished by a thorough knowledge of military affairs and the capability in a given situation to choose the most expedient forms and methods of influencing combat readiness and discipline, high principles and persistence in implementing party policy in his section, and modesty in his behavior.

In the struggle to increase the quality of combat training and strengthen discipline it is necessary to make active use of Marxist-Leninist training of officers, political studies for warrant officers, and political classes for enlisted personnel, the entire arsenal of agitation and propaganda work, and the capabilities of cultural and educational institutions. The Central Committee Political Report to the Party Congress noted that the most important thing on which party influence should be concentrated is seeing that every person understands the criticality of the current situation and its changing nature. All our plans will remain unsettled if people are left complacent and if we are not able to arouse the labor and social activeness of the masses and their energy and initiative.

In the summer training period the struggle will continue for further strengthening military discipline--a key component of the combat potential of the Armed Forces. Life requires that we create an atmosphere of thoroughly



analyzing its state in military councils, political bodies, staffs, and in every Army and Navy collective and that search for new forms and methods of establishing prescribed order. All this must be at the fore today. It is important to reinforce that positive experience which was accumulated during the winter training period. In units of the Carpathian Military District, for example, positive achievements were made in strengthening discipline by concentrating the efforts of all levels of supervisory personnel on organizational work with people, absolute fulfillment of prescribed duties for training and educating subordinates, constant concern about satisfying their needs and requirements, and increasing the role of senior NCOs in the subunits. In many military collectives of the Belorussian Military District this was achieved through a stricter organization of combat and political training, increasing the disciplining role of the training process, and purposeful work in military collectives lagging behind.

An analysis of the state of military discipline during the winter period shows, however, that not everyone is aware of the need for restructuring work to strengthen it. There is still a considerable lack of concreteness in the activities of some communist-leaders, political bodies, and party organizations, and they have a great passion for high-flown phrases and promises in which real deeds are lost. There still remain shortcomings such as low exactingness, crudeness, remoteness of a number of officers from subordinates, and the inability to influence a specific person. Purposeful and energetic actions are important today in all the work to strengthen discipline. Solving this problem in essence has a political importance for maintaining high combat readiness, meaning that the approach to it must also be political. Above all, it is necessary to concentrate the efforts of all personnel on improving party-political work in every military collective, increasing their exactingness on themselves and subordinates, and improving organizational work with people. It is important that party-political work on strengthening discipline be preventive in nature, preventing breaches of discipline. There is much to be done to improve the personal examples set by communists and their personal contribution to strengthening discipline; they must show more concern developing their needs to be closer to people, to achieve high end results in educating personnel, and to search for new methods of strengthening prescribed order.

The Komsomol organizations of units and subunits are called upon to play an important role in the struggle to increase combat readiness and strengthen discipline. In accordance with the requirements of the 27th Party Congress and the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Further Improving Party Leadership of the Komsomol and Increasing Its Role in Communist Education of Young People," the work style of Komsomol organizations must be thoroughly investigated, their activities directed toward completing the main tasks of the training period, and a high moral substance be introduced into their work. It is important that the political workers of units and subunits personally study the state of affairs in Komsomol collectives, be involved in training the aktiv, and continually and purposefully influence the young people. The task of Komsomol organizations is to continue the persistent struggle to ensure personal examples of Komsomol members and young soldiers, cultivate in them better moral qualities, and establish in military collectives a healthy moral atmosphere and strictly prescribed relations between service members.



The summer training period is a severe test of the political and professional maturity of the defenders of the homeland, the depth of their understanding of the new tasks set forth by the party, and their readiness to do everything to carry them out. The reorganization of the work style of military councils, commanders, political bodies, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations is aimed at achieving high qualitative indicators in military labor. This must result in high combat readiness and strong discipline of personnel and exemplary fulfillment of the high demands which have been imposed on the USSR Armed Forces by the 27th CPSU Congress.

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MILITARY SCIENCE

RESPONSE TO U.S. FIRST STRIKE THREAT DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 86 (Signed to press 19 May 86) pp 23-29

[Article by Col G. Lukava, professor and doctor of philosophical sciences: "The Surprise Factor in Imperialism's Aggressive Policy"]

[Text] Mankind is now going through perhaps one of the most difficult stages in its development. The cause of this is the aggressive, militaristic course of the most reactionary forces of imperialism led by the right-wing U.S. monopoly bourgeoisie. "By virtue of its social nature," the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th Party Congress points out, "imperialism constantly generates an aggressive, adventuristic policy."

The imperialist military relies on surprise in its aggressive plans. Strictly speaking, the desire to achieve a military strategic superiority in an of itself confirms this. The reactionary circles of the West, above all the Pentagon's strategists, do not wish to give up on the obviously unrealizable idea of the possibility of a delivering with impunity a surprise nuclear strike on the USSR and achieving victory in a nuclear war. Therefore, the question of surprise, which the aggressor is counting on, and its military and political aspects cannot help but attract attention today. It requires a comprehensive analysis and comprehension in order to present clearly the essence of specific countermeasures to be taken to foil the adventuristic plans and insidious schemes of imperialist reaction.

In its essence, military surprise represents actions unexpected for a state or group of states, as well as means and methods of armed conflict making it possible with the least expenditure of manpower and resources, efforts, and time to strike the enemy when he is least prepared to repel a strike. Such a beginning of aggression, imperialist believe, will enable the attacking forces to eliminate or weaken organized resistance by the armed forces of the opposing side and ensure achievement of military, material, and spiritual superiority over the enemy.

In a situation where capitalism has grown into the monopoly stage of its development, reliance on surprise has essentially become the rule in the aggressor's actions. This has been confirmed by the history of two world wars and dozens of local wars unleashed because of imperialist states. During the

dismal years of the "cold war," the U.S. military and political leadership adopted the idea of the fascist blitzkrieg--a perfidious, surprise attack on the USSR and a "lightning-fast" first strike with all forces and resources in order to achieve decisive strategic results already at the very start of the war.

Between 1946 and 1958, this problem was solved quite simply in the Pentagon--they planned to deliver a surprise massive nuclear strike against major Soviet industrial and administrative centers. On the banks of the Potomac they believed that this was precisely the way to achieve a quick victory. Advancing the strategic concept of "massive retaliation," the White House and the American generals proceeded from the fact that although the USSR had eliminated the United States' monopoly on nuclear weapons, at that time it did not have the capability to carry out similar retaliatory actions against objectives located on U.S. territory. After all, at that time aircraft were the nuclear-weapon carriers, and Soviet military airfield were located considerably farther from U.S. territory than American air bases were from the USSR.

In 1959 a new branch of the armed forces was created in the USSR--the Strategic Rocket Forces. This was a forced, but extremely necessary step in response to the growing aggressiveness on the part of imperialism. Through the heroic labor of Soviet scientists, engineers and workers, missiles of various types and purpose capable of reaching U.S. territory were developed and widely introduced into the troops. The Soviet Union created its own nuclear submarine fleet, increasing the vulnerability of a probable aggressor. That is when the "simple and long ago solved" problem concerning the forms and methods of waging a nuclear war unexpectedly became extremely complicated for the U.S. strategists. With deepest disappointment, the Pentagon admitted that in the changed conditions a surprise attack on the USSR would not prevent a powerful retaliatory nuclear missile strike.

Without abandoning their aggressive anti-Soviet plans, American ruling circles began feverishly looking for new forms of armed conflict against real socialism and relying on various war scenarios both with and without the use of nuclear weapons. These intrigues were reflected in the notorious "flexible response" and "realistic deterrence" doctrines, which called for a more cautious approach in planning war against the Soviet Union. But, as before, they were based on a reliance on surprise.

Ignoring historical experience and the realities of our times, in the early 1980's American imperialism decided to make a global technological leap in the military field and break the military strategic parity established between the United States and the USSR. Having initiated an unprecedented arms race, Washington in essence returned to the adventuristic anti-Soviet concepts of the 1940's and 1950's. The United States is developing and widely publicizing military strategic concepts "justifying" reliance on the surprise factor and the offensive nature of using all the armed services equipped with the most destructive types of nuclear and conventional weapons. This is also evidenced by the new military doctrine of the United States, the aggressive essence of which was openly expressed by U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, calling it a strategy of "direct confrontation" between the United States and the USSR

on a global and regional scale. The essence of the doctrine is the unrestricted use of U.S. strategic offensive forces in a surprise first strike against the Soviet Union.

The policy of "direct confrontation" actually further develops the same offensive nuclear strategy which was advanced by the previous occupants of the White House and the Pentagon. But now it is even more open and aggressive in nature. In accordance with this policy, the Pentagon's generals are preparing for lightning-fast, limited, and lengthy wars, planning in any case to use weapons of mass destruction first and nurturing an obviously illusory hope for victory.

High-ranking individuals in the U.S. defense department today talk much about a limited nuclear war, trying to convince the world public that supposedly such a war would not affect the peaceful population of the warring states, much less of other countries. But the idea of a limited nuclear war is a keen variant of the same "first strike" concept. The American medium-range nuclear missiles stationed on the territory of a number of Western European NATO countries are intended precisely for ensuring military strategic surprise when delivering such a strike.

Seeing that the balance existing within the framework of agreements reached earlier cannot be broken by a quantitative buildup of modern arms and that the Soviet Union responds immediately with adequate measures to U.S. attempts to gain a unilateral military advantage, Washington set as its goal to put an end to equal security by a different way--rendering the other side's retaliatory weapons "harmless" by using space-based strike weapons. The directive signed by President Reagan in July 1982 on the national space policy for the next decade places special emphasis on exploring space for military purposes. Expanding this directive, on 23 March 1983 the chief of the White House announced the extremely dangerous for all of humanity "Star Wars" program, called the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) for purposes of misinforming the public. Violating the permanent ABM Treaty concluded earlier between the United States and the USSR, the American side has decided to turn space into a strategic staging base of aggression. Presently the United States is speeding up the creation [sozdaniye] of a second-generation antisatellite system (ASAT). Several tests have been conducted, including the destruction of a real target in space. A special command has been set up in the U.S. armed forces and given the name Space Command.

As the American press points out, \$3 trillion are needed to implement the SDI program. Needless to say, this requires the appropriate international and internal "public" support, extensive publicity, and direct approval by NATO allies. Being aware of this, the Washington administration is putting all mass information and propaganda media and diplomatic channels into action in order to make the "Star Wars" program appear "attractive" and at all costs hide its true purpose from mankind.

Striving to distract people's attention from the widescale military preparations of the United States and NATO, Western propaganda has sharply stepped up the fuss about the myth of the "Soviet military threat" and making great efforts to spread false claims about the West "lagging behind" in the



military sphere, about the appearance of new "windows of vulnerability" in the U.S. war machine, and so forth. All sorts of pseudoscientific "theoretical research" by NATO specialists, experts, and political figures are used to support these false claims.

The aspiration of the White House and Pentagon to deploy space-based strike weapons as quickly as possible is intended to increase sharply the first-strike capability against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. After all, it is no secret that, simultaneously with the decision to begin development of the SDI system, U.S. ruling circles are speeding up development of the armed forces over the entire spectrum of the so-called nuclear triad. According to American press reports, in the past 3 years B-52 strategic bombers have been armed with 1,080 cruise missiles. The U.S. Air Force is receiving the new B-1B strategic bomber, and next the "Stealth." Modernization of the Navy's missiles and arms is being sped up.

As THE NEW YORK TIMES recently wrote, the U.S. Armed Forces will receive the MX ICBM's earlier than planned. Development of another missile--the Midgetman--is nearing completion. The stationing of American medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe continues. At the same time, the process of modernizing and creating [sozdaniye] new types of conventional weapons is continuing to expand in the United States and other NATO countries.

The Soviet Union is countering the rush by overseas and NATO militarists to build nuclear weapons with a clear, precise peaceloving policy corresponding to the expectations of all peoples, a policy of reason and good will. In 1982 the USSR unilaterally pledged not to use nuclear weapons first and called upon the United States to do the same. Since 1983 our country has had a unilateral moratorium in effect on being the first to put antisatellite weapons in space. Back before the summit meeting at Geneva, the Soviet Union suspended further deployment of its medium-range missiles and implementation of other retaliatory measures in Europe and appealed to the United States to respond in kind. From 6 August until the end of 1985 the USSR unilaterally ceased all nuclear detonations. A proposal was made to the United States and other nuclear powers to do the same. The results of the Geneva meeting prompted the Soviet leadership to take another important step--to extend the moratorium on nuclear detonations until 31 March 1986. Finally, in a statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January of this year, a comprehensive program for ridding the earth of weapons of mass destruction over the next 15 years was proposed. Weighing all the circumstances related to the security of its own people and all of mankind as well, in May the Soviet government decided to extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing to August of this year.

Naturally, such unilateral steps in the military sphere cannot be taken as permanent if the other side declines to implement the proposals made by us and continues the arms race. Contrary to common sense, the White House today is taking precisely such a stand. On the eve of the end of the moratorium announced by the Soviet Union, the United States carried out another nuclear detonation and announced its plans to detonate a number of nuclear devices in the near future. The U.S. ruling circles continue to lay emphasis on pursuing a militaristic policy and rely on strength in order to dictate its will on

other countries and peoples. Furthermore, they make statements publicly that this is precisely the method they will use to influence the Soviet Union's policy as well.

But, as the Soviet leadership has repeatedly emphasized, these attempts are worthless. Force has never worked for anyone against our state before, and now it is simply ridiculous.

The Soviet Union has been forced to maintain the strategic balance by improving and developing its own armed forces and also by taking other necessary defensive steps. And imperialism will not succeed by any tricks in changing the correlation of military forces in its favor. Material and intellectual potential ensures the Soviet Union the ability to create any weapon if we are forced to do so. But we understand the full extent of the responsibility facing today's and future generations. "We are deeply convinced," stated comrade M.S. Gorbachev, "that it is not the "Star Wars" program with which we must enter the third millennium, but widescale projects for peaceful exploration of space by forces of all mankind."

The reliance by militant circles of U.S. and NATO imperialism on the surprise factor and on the possibility of a "disarming" first nuclear strike against the USSR and its allies requires a constant set of countermeasures on our part which would reliably ensure the failure of a perfidious attack by any aggressor and its decisive defeat. This set of countermeasures is supported by the countless advantages of the socialist system, our economic and defensive might, and the unity, cohesion, and close cooperation of the countries of the socialist community.

First of all, preserving the established military strategic parity, i.e., the approximate equality of combat capabilities of the two opposing military organizations--the USSR and Warsaw Pact armed forces and the U.S. and NATO armed forces--is of great importance in frustrating sudden aggression by imperialism. "The Soviet state and its allies," the new wording of the CPSU Program points out, "do not seek to achieve military superiority, but also will not permit the military strategic balance established in the world arena to be broken."

At the same time, the socialist states are pressing to lower steadily the level of this balance and reduce the number of arms on both sides so as to ensure the security of all peoples.

The highest vigilance of the working people of socialist states and armed defenders of socialism occupies a special place in the set of measures to prevent surprise aggression on the part of imperialism. Revolutionary vigilance for us is quite a broad concept, many-sided, and at the same time sufficiently concrete. It is a specific social and class orientation and direction of consciousness and practical action corresponding to communist ideals and interests of defending the socialist homeland and its security and ensuring a high degree of activeness of public institutions and USSR citizens and their real contribution to exposing and intersecting the hostile actions of forces of reaction and aggression.

In a political sense, vigilance is expressed in the ability of Soviet people in a timely manner to uncover the aggressive plans of imperialists and recognize and render harmless their subversive activities in economic, social, defensive, and ideological spheres. Vigilance is impossible without a thorough understanding of the political situation, meaning that it is closely linked with the class assessment of phenomena of internal and international affairs, a clear awareness of the threat originating from the class enemy, and an irreconcilable attitude toward it. Vigilance in a socialist society is based on people's communist conviction, which is demonstrated in selfless devotion to the motherland and hatred of its enemies and in a firm, acute sense of responsibility for the fate of their country. Vigilance assumes not only a person's constant desire to labor selflessly and even to do heroic deeds in the name of the motherland, but also a daily demonstration of efficiency, smartness, restraint, discipline, decisive refutation of slanderous fabrications and provocative rumors, and strict keeping of state and military secrets. Vigilance is one of the most important moral fighting qualities of the armed defenders of socialism.

Political vigilance in the USSR has taken on nationwide importance and has become a vivid demonstration of life-giving Soviet patriotism and proletarian socialist internationalism, and an inalienable quality of every member of our society. In the practical activities of the CPSU and the Soviet government it is expressed primarily in recognizing in advance attempts of imperialist infringement on the achievements of socialism, posing a danger for the vital interests of our people, the peoples of the entire socialist community, and the defensive capability of the countries of socialism. It is also reflected in all the necessary steps taken for timely frustration of hostile actions of the imperialist warmongers.

The 27th CPSU Congress very definitely pointed out that as long as there is a danger of imperialism unleashing aggression, military conflicts, and various provocations, it is necessary to devote unremitting attention to increasing the defensive might of the USSR and strengthening its security. The Soviet Armed Forces and state security agencies must always be ready to intersect imperialism's intrigues against the USSR and its allies and to defeat any aggressor.

Combat readiness virtually represents that state of the Army and Navy which ensures in any situation their immediate transition to active and decisive actions in order to defeat an enemy. It is characterized by firmness, the ability of troops to carry out successfully pre-planned tasks, mobility, and readiness for combat operations under the most unforeseen conditions and with an abrupt change in the situation.

Of exceptionally great importance in maintaining the USSR Armed Forces in a state of constant combat readiness are the activities of military cadres in forming in personnel of units and subunits the correct scientific idea of the role of surprise in the military strategic plans of imperialism, particularly American imperialism, and real measures to counter these plans. Such a task is being carried out through purposeful and many-sided organizational and ideological activities of military councils, political bodies, and party organizations, especially in the combat and political training process.



Predicting the nature and peculiarities of the war which imperialists are planning against us and the forms it will take, personnel's knowledge of the probable enemy and his capabilities, and a thorough study of the military preparations of the United States and its Atlantic allies occupy an important place. It appears necessary to have a comprehensive analysis of the maneuvers and exercises which are continually conducted by NATO armed forces in direct proximity to the borders of socialist countries. Analyzing these exercises makes it possible to conclude that the armies of the member states of this imperialist bloc are preparing to unleash widescale aggression against the socialist community without a pause in operations.

In a contemporary war, should the imperialist risk unleashing it, the initial period will be of particular importance, when combat operations unfold in a short period of time on an unprecedented scale and encompass land, water, and air space, and we know that the overseas war machine is openly preparing to make active use of space for aggression as well. In such conditions, the difference between the front and rear will virtually disappear.

Exemplary, vigilant alert duty by personnel--maintaining specially assigned forces and resources at a high degree of combat readiness for carrying out suddenly arising tasks or conducting combat operations--is taking on ever-increasing importance in terms of foiling a surprise attack by imperialist aggressors. Increasing the quality and effectiveness of combat training in every possible way and making it as close as possible to the actual conditions of a contemporary war play an enormous role.

During classes and training sessions, tactical exercises, sea and ocean cruises, and when standing alert duty, it is important to explain to the soldiers that the USSR Armed Forces possess the most modern types of weapons and combat equipment which embody the latest achievements of domestic science. In their tactical and technical characteristics they are not inferior to corresponding armaments of the armies of the probable enemy.

At the same time, being concerned about further strengthening the country's defenses, our party is orienting the scientific cadres towards developing fundamental research and solving military-technical problems related to finding new, promising means of conducting armed conflict, which the aggressor counts on using in a war.

One of the main directions of increasing combat readiness of the Army and Navy is moral and psychological training of personnel for actions in conditions where the enemy uses weapons of mass destruction and fundamentally new types of weapons of various classes and purposes. This training is intended to reduce the psychological effect from the enemy's surprise use of the latest means of armed conflict and to increase the overall combat aggressiveness of personnel, and hence thwart the aggressor's plans and ensure inflicting a crushing retaliatory strike on him.

Reliably ensuring the security of the motherland and the achievements of socialism, increasing the vigilance of the Soviet people, strengthening the country's defenses, and maintaining a high combat readiness of the Army and



Navy are constantly at the center of attention of the CPSU and the Soviet government. The guiding role of Lenin's party was, is, and will be that constant factor which guarantees the strength and solidity of our defenses and the might and constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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## MILITARY SCIENCE

### COL KOZLOV ON DEFINITION OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 pp 8-9

[Article by Col K. Kozlov, Doctor of Military Science, Professor: "Soviet Military Doctrine: Debates on the CPSU Program"]

[Text] Policy in the sphere of defense and national security and Soviet military doctrine, which is purely defensive in nature and is directed toward defense against external attack, are formulated and implemented with the party playing a leading role. -- From the new edition of the CPSU Program

First about the term "military doctrine." This is a "system of views, adopted in a country for a specific time, on the essence, aims and character of a potential future war, on preparing the country and its armed forces for it and on the modes of fighting it." This is the definition we find in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia.

Military doctrine determines: what kind of measures and with what enemy it will be necessary to fight in a probable future war; the goals and missions which will be assigned to the armed forces prior to the outbreak of war; what they must have to reach the assigned goals; in what manner it will be necessary to build the military forces and prepare the army and country for war; and, finally, how to fight the war if it is unleashed.

Military doctrine takes shape on the basis of all the nation's vital activities and is a result of the highly complex and long historical processes of the origin and development of the state's concepts in the area of defense. The fundamental points of doctrine are determined by the political leadership of the state, taking into account the socio-political and economic structure, the level of production, the availability of resources for fighting a war, the geographic position of the country and its probable enemy and flow from the state's domestic and foreign policy.

Among the sources of Soviet military doctrine were V. I. Lenin and one of his true disciples, the great military theoretician and outstanding military leader, M. V. Frunze. Mikhail Vasilyevich, leaning on Ilyich's works and instructions for national defense, on the Communist Party program documents

and on the decrees and decisions of the Soviet Government, first worked out the fundamental position of a unified military doctrine on the basis of which the integrated and coordinated plan for the overall work of the socialist state and its armed forces must be developed to prepare to repulse imperialist aggression, the military construction which must be done and military art that must be developed and the training which the troops must accomplish.

M. V. Frunze's article "The Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army" became one of the classic examples of Soviet military-theoretical thought and essentially retains its timeliness even today. In it attention was given to the practical significance of a unified military doctrine for developing a system of moral-political and psychological preparation of the people for military trials. It is noted that military doctrine determines "...the military-political propaganda and the whole system of education in the country;" and delineated groups of problems which make up the two aspects of the "unified military doctrine: -- political and technical.

The CPSU in giving leadership to military construction assigns great significance to the development of military policy as a component part of overall party and government policies. The new edition of the CPSU Program emphasises that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regards defending the socialist homeland, strengthening national defense and safeguarding state security one of the most important functions of the Soviet state of the whole people.

Military doctrine for the USSR Armed Forces is the guide for its preparation to repulse aggression and conduct military operations. It connects the theory together with the practice of military affairs. The main views on the essence, content and character of a probable war as well as the principal propositions of military science and the requirements of military art accepted and in practice in our Armed Forces are crystallized in it. Military doctrine gives an organizing and mobilizing impact on the combat capability and combat readiness of the soldiers in the army and navy.

The political aspect plays the main role in the formation of military doctrine. It establishes the relationship between the political goals of a war and the potential and capabilities to conduct it. The achievement of such coordination is an objective requirement, the violation of which would lead to adventurism and defeat. An obvious example of this is the crushing defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan in World War II which was unleashed by them and which also convincingly confirmed the correctness of Soviet military doctrine.

The foundation of the modern military doctrines of the leading imperialist powers, especially the U.S. consists of a clearly expressed anti-Soviet, anti-socialist and anti-democratic tendency, heightened militarization of the economy and direct material preparation for a new world war with the goal of realizing their hegemonic intentions. Many government and military leaders in capitalist countries look at military doctrine only in the single, purely technical, aspect without connecting it to the state's social structure, policies and ideology, thus revealing the nature of the unjust wars unleashed by imperialism and exposing the truly guilty.

The essence and direction of Soviet military doctrine is diametrically opposite. It rests on the laws and propositions of historic and dialectic materialism, Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army and conclusions from Soviet military science. Its social and political content reflects the character of the social structure in the USSR and other socialist countries, the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet government and the vital interests of the Soviet people.

At the base of the military doctrines of the USSR and the other countries in the socialist commonwealth lie the progressive and just ideas of protecting socialist gains for the workers and the security of their peoples. In the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact participating states of 15 May 1980 it is expressed absolutely clearly that they "do not now, never have had and never will have any strategic doctrine other than a defensive doctrine."

The heroic history of our Homeland and its Armed Forces is a convincing confirmation of the defensive character of Soviet military doctrine. From its first days of existence the young Soviet Republic offered Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence in opposition to the imperialist policy of war. Up to the present time the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government has been determined by the organic unity of the love of peace and constant readiness to actively defend the Socialist Fatherland. One can by no means forget the behest by Ilyich: "Our steps toward peace must be accompanied by all our efforts toward military preparedness."

Soviet military doctrine is developed with a consideration of the development of the nation's economic, scientific and moral-political potential and the cultural level and traditions of the Soviet people. Its essence under modern conditions is to block the extremely dangerous policies of imperialism, halt the arms race and maintain a peaceful life for the people. "We do not strive to attain a one-sided advantage over the United States or NATO countries or military superiority over them," said the CPSU CC General Secretary, comrade M. S. Gorbachev, "we want an end, not a continuation of the arms race..." But everyone must know," he emphasized, "that we will never neglect the interests of our Homeland and its allies."

The tenets of Soviet military doctrine are not hardened dogma, but scientific views, developed under concrete historic conditions. They reflect the experience of the Great Patriotic War which, even four decades after the victory, helps to strengthen the military power of the Soviet Armed Forces and the ability of the USSR to defend itself.

In responding to the concrete interests and capabilities of our state, Soviet military doctrine at the same time is determined by the commitment of the peoples of the USSR to their internationalist duty. And this means that the Soviet Armed Forces will defend the freedom and liberty of fraternal socialist states with which the Soviet Union is linked by treaties.

The military-technical content of Soviet military doctrine covers a wide circle of points concerning maintaining the USSR Armed Forces at a high level of military readiness; improving their technical equipment, organizational



structure and command and control system; improving the field, air and maritime training considering the character and peculiarities of modern war; and further developing Soviet military art. In other words, this aspect of doctrine determines the ways, resources and capabilities of accomplishing the mission of reliably defending the Socialist Fatherland which has been given to the Armed Forces by the nation's political leadership.

Soviet military doctrine provides for the timely deployment of the USSR Armed Forces to repulse a surprise enemy attack and to retaliate with powerful attacks on him. It requires not only defense, opposing the aggressor with passive resources and capabilities of defense, but also his destruction under any circumstances. For this reason our doctrine here comes from the generally known laws of war and the principles of military art.

In his time V. I. Lenin wrote: "...it is unwise and even criminal for an army not to prepare to use all types of weapons, all means and methods of fighting which the enemy may." Lead by this proposition from Lenin, the Soviet Union is developing the means of conducting war and those methods of operation for the Armed Forces which can reliably repulse the enemy.

Soviet military doctrine always has and always will proceed from the principle of retaliatory, that is defensive actions. The USSR regards nuclear attack as the most severe crime against mankind.

Our state is against weapons in space. As stated by CPSU CC General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev, "there is material and intellectual potential to provide the Soviet Union with the possibility to create any weapon if we are forced. But we remind the whole world of the responsibility to the present and future generations... Preventing the spread of the arms race into space means removing an obstacle to deep cuts in nuclear weapons."

Equipping the USSR Armed Forces with the newest weapons and combat equipment still more enhance the importance of mankind in deciding the fates of war. The main power of the army and navy, it was noted in the 27th CPSU Congress, is our outstanding soldiers. Simultaneously with their social and economic development the country has increased their education and development level. 97 percent of the personnel in the USSR Armed Forces have higher and middle education and 85 percent are communists and komsomol members. The Party and state, according to the CPSU CC Political Report, have striven and are striving to have the Soviet soldiers -- officers and men -- bear their heavy service, always feel the concern and attention of society so that our army will be a school of education in civil responsibility, courage and patriotism.

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ARMED FORCES

RESPONSES TO GONCHAROV ARTICLE ON WARRANT OFFICERS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 86 pp 14-15

[Interview with Col Gen V. Goncharov: "The Individual -- At the Forefront"]

[Text] In the January 1986 issue of the journal an article was published by Col Gen V. Goncharov, first deputy chief, USSR Ministry of Defense Main Cadres Administration, entitled "On Service As Warrant Officers." It occasioned numerous readers' responses. Expressing gratitude to the author for his thorough description of the basic provisions of the new "Statute on Military Service by Warrant Officers in the USSR Armed Forces," the readers, at the same time, request a more detailed explanation of some of the clauses of this document. Our correspondent met with the author and asked him to answer the readers' questions.

Question. Vladimir Andreyevich, in their letters many warrant officers broach everyday problems associated with their reassignment. Here, for example, is one of the most typical: "I am finishing the term of service stipulated in the normal voluntary obligation. I submitted a request to my commander to be transferred to another unit in our military district. There it is possible to obtain housing, and the commander agreed to assign me to a vacant position in my specialty and submitted the request. However, the commander of the unit in which I am now serving refused to transmit it and stated: "Either serve with us or leave the service." Is he right? asks Warrant Officer V. Baranovskiy. After all the Statute states that warrant officers may transfer from one unit to another by so requesting at the end of the term for which they were accepted for service, if they have a valid reason. Would you clarify precisely what is meant by "valid reasons" for such transfers? Can it be in this specific case that solving a housing problem is not a valid reason?"

Answer. Before I answer the substance of these questions, I would like to emphasize that the new Statute was worked out during the period of active preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress, and it reflects the concern of the party and government about the armed defenders of the homeland, about further improving the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces and about creating the necessary conditions for warrant officers to best fulfill their military duties. And the situation which has occurred in the service of Warrant Officer V. Baranovskiy should be viewed, first of all, from these positions. In this case the commander reacted formalistically to the warrant

officer's request, placing his narrow-minded principle, either work here or get out, as of paramount importance.

Would state interests really suffer from allowing a conscientious, experienced specialist to transfer for legitimate reasons to another unit, in an equivalent duty, and thereby solving a difficult housing problem?! Of course the commander and cadre organ worker should recognize the reason for the transfer as satisfactory and petition the appropriate authorities.

Or take, for example, a situation which occurred in the life of Warrant Officer V. Dzyuba. His parents, participants in the Great Patriotic War, are living in the southern part of the country. The years have taken their toll and the veterans need help and looking after. Their son completed his term of voluntary obligation and Warrant Officer Dzyuba requested transfer to one of the units located not far from his home. The commander of that unit agreed to assign him to a vacant position. However, the warrant officer's request was regarded formalistically and callously.

And in general, when we are talking about a transfer to solve a housing problem or some sort of family difficulties, commanders and cadre workers should not create artificial difficulties, but must display maximum attention and good will toward their subordinates. It goes without saying that it is necessary to take into account their professional and moral-political qualities and attitude toward service. If a warrant officer, through his conscientious military labor, has earned high authority in the collective, he has every right to be treated with respect. In short, the commander always and in everything must place at the forefront the interests of ensuring high combat readiness and concern for people.

Question. And how would you, Vladimir Andreyevich, respond to Warrant Officer A. Pudov, the author of this letter? "By specialty I am a long range communications technician. By coincidence I had to interrupt my service for six years. At the end of this year my regular mandatory service ends. So that when I reach the maximum age for remaining on active military service I may obtain the pension established by law, I would like to continue service in the area of the Extreme North or the Far East. My family agrees to come with me. My apartment could be given to a coworker.

I am aware that in one of the subunits located in the Far East such specialists are needed and there they are willing to accept me in this position. However, one condition was set: an equivalent replacement must be found and he must have an apartment. Otherwise, the transfer will not take place and you will have to leave the army.

Understandably, no commander wants to part with good cadres. But the question arises: Is it really more advantageous for the Armed Forces to lose a first class specialist than to transfer him to another unit in the same branch of arms, where he could continue his service and be of considerable benefit to the state?"

Answer. One can understand Warrant Officer Pudov. His request is both explainable for personal reasons and at the same time seems justified. After

all, Anatoliy Andreyevich is not requesting a transfer to the south shore of the Crimea, but to one of the most remote garrisons. And his specialty is associated with maintaining equipment and standing combat watch. So the unit should look more thoroughly into this situation and display good will and concern about the warrant officer. It seems to me that a favorable decision about his transfer would be appropriate.

As for the condition -- to find an equivalent replacement -- in this regard as well the demands are unjustified. After all, commanders and cadre organ workers are called upon to solve questions pertaining to the selection and placement of cadres. Attempts by officials to transfer these duties to the warrant officers themselves should be assessed as an unsuitable practice of shirking one's responsibilities.

And there is still one other thing to which I would like to direct attention. Experience shows that many warrant officers, especially from among rear services specialists, attempt to be transferred to the Extreme North and the Far East. This attraction to "changing positions" is understandable -- they are granted larger benefits and advantages. This situation must not be overlooked. After all, any transfer to a remote area is associated with substantial material expenses. Therefore, when examining questions concerning the transfer of warrant officers to preferential areas it is necessary, first of all, to take into account the manning level of the units and ships with specialists having military skills of this category of servicemen. The interests of maintaining high combat readiness must always be preeminent.

Question. The published article states that warrant officers may be detailed, with their agreement, for subsequent service from the Armed Forces to the KGB [Committee for State Security] and to the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Senior Warrant Officer V. Kazakevich requests an explanation of how such transfers are carried out in practice and what is required. Can a warrant officer apply for such a transfer before the completion of his term of voluntary obligation?

Answer. Since the second question has been asked in many other letters, I will answer it first. According to the new Statute warrant officers may apply for a transfer only at the end of the term of their voluntary obligation, and with valid reason. A transfer at another time is permitted only in cases of extreme needs of the service.

With respect to transfers of warrant officers from the Armed Forces to the KGB and the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and vice versa, such transfers take place on an individual basis by orders of the main headquarters of the Armed Services; headquarters of the Rear and Civil Defense; administrations of commanders (chiefs) of branches of arms; and main and central administrations of the Ministry of Defense, in coordination with the cadre organs of the KGB or the Main Administration of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

This is done as follows. Two or three months before the end of his term of voluntary obligation the warrant officer submits a report through command channels stating his reasons for such a transfer, and also attaches a report



of the attitude of the commander of the unit in which the warrant officer intends to continue his active military service.

Question. Reserve Warrant Officer A. Ivanov writes: "I was removed from the Armed Forces for conduct discrediting the title of a military serviceman. Currently I am serving honorably at an enterprise. I have become accustomed to the collective, but my heart aches for military service and again pulls me toward the navy. I am asking for advice: May I again be called up for naval service and what is necessary for this?"

Answer. According to the new Statute, warrant officers discharged for the above reason may in principle be accepted again for active service, if they have worked for no less than 2 years in production, acquitted themselves well in labor and in social life and are no more than 35 years of age at the time of their second callup. In such cases the callup takes place if the individual has favorable references, at the request of rayon or city commissariats, taking into account the opinion of the local governmental organs. Army, flotilla and equivalent and higher commanders are authorized to issue the callup orders. However, it should be kept in mind that a second callup of this category of servicemen is always fraught with objective difficulties.

Many conscientious workers express their desire to serve as warrant officers and, naturally, military commissariats give them preference. From this one should draw the conclusion that it is necessary from the very first days of one's arrival in the army or navy to fulfill one's military duty honorably and worthily, and be disciplined.

This is the guarantee of the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces.

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ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES

Talk But No Action on Reorganization

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jul 86 p 2

[Follow-up on article, under the rubric "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Spoke Out: Answers, Responses, Results": "They Expect Reminders"]

[Text] Commentary on Articles Published Under the Rubric "The Reorganization: The Communist's Position"

The military construction detachment had fallen short of the plan again, and stagnation and complacency reigned in the party organization. Some Communists had abused their service position, and everyone pretended they saw nothing. There was no shortage of talk at meetings about the need to readjust and work in the new manner, however. Lieutenant V. Semenov, a political worker arrived in the detachment and spoke out against this divergence of words and deeds. Neither in the collective nor in the political section, to which he turned, did he receive support, however. What is more, he was even criticized for lack of awareness, for not wanting to take into account the difficulties and circumstances, and so forth.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers learned of this situation in the article "They Drew a Line," published on 1 February of this year. At that time the newspaper reported that it intended to continue from a broader perspective the discussion underway about how the reorganization is going in the army and navy party organizations and how they are establishing the new approach to everything in the spirit of the party's present demands. A new column soon appeared on its pages: "The Reorganization: The Communist's Position."

In a number of articles under this rubric, the authors have raised acute and pressing problems, revealed shortcomings and proposed ways to correct them in the work of the political organs, party organizations and Communists. Naturally, it is important for the editors and the readers to know what the reaction to the criticism has been.

Let us say at the outset that it has been prompt and principled. In response to the report "We Criticize a Lot, But the Deficiencies Remain....," published on 5 April, the editors received a reply signed by Major General R. Gorelov, first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Moscow Military District. The

omissions revealed by the newspaper were severely assessed, the guilty parties were punished, and specific organizational steps were taken to see that the omissions were not repeated. A comprehensive group of generals and officers from the staff and the district directorates visited the formation discussed in the article. They provided the commanders, political workers, party committees and bureaus with assistance in making their work more effective.

A conflict was discussed in a report entitled "How Difficult to Bring Oneself to" from the Siberian Military District. It was printed on 26 April. One of the Communists had "dared" criticize Major V. Susikov, regimental chief of staff, at a party meeting, for unworthy conduct. The latter soon took retaliatory "steps." And he got away with it. The command element and the regimental party committee demonstrated a lack of principle in assessing the negative incidents.

Following publication of the report, a group of officers headed by Major General Yu. Gudimov, first deputy chief of the district political directorate, traveled to the location. It was he who reported to the editors on the steps taken. The ugly occurrence was assessed from a standpoint of principle, the reply stated. It has been recommended to the higher command element that Major V. Susikov be demoted for personal lack of discipline and unfitting conduct. He was expelled from the CPSU by decision of a party commission under the formation political section. The regimental commander was warned by the district commander that he was not completely measuring up in his service position. He was also issued a stern party reprimand. The officials who demonstrated a lack of principle and liberalism were also punished, and steps have been taken to improve the moral climate in the collective.

Prompt and principled response to criticism is also the Communist's position in the reorganization, is it not? Unfortunately, however, other attitudes are also taken toward articles. Let us return at least to the report "They Drew a Line..." There can be no doubt that it raised important issues. This is confirmed by, among other things, the reply sent by Major General of Justice A. Polonskiy, judge advocate for the Volga Military District.

The reply was not printed at once. We wanted to see how the district political directorate and the political section of the district construction directorate would respond to the critical article. After all, many of the issues raised were under their jurisdiction. There was no reply. The editors then directed the permanent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent for the Volga Military District to remind the officials there that the readers expected reports on the steps taken. The correspondent did remind Colonel I. Fedoseyev, chief of the section for supervision of party-political work in military construction units, and Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Shevel, chief of the construction directorate's political section, and more than once. The reply was a long time coming even after that, however. It arrived in the editorial office the other day. Five months, no more and no less, had passed since the report was published.

The reply reported that the newspaper article had been discussed at a meeting of the district military council and a conference of the district political directorate. The criticism was acknowledged to be valid. Lieutenant Colonel O. Grigorash was issued a stern reprimand for serious omissions in his work. He was also relieved of his position and appointed to a lower one. Lieutenant Colonel V.

Kuznetsov, former deputy detachment commander for political affairs, was expelled from the CPSU and discharged from the Armed Forces. Lieutenant Colonel B. Chistyakov, deputy chief of the political section, was recommended for discharge into the reserve. Severe disciplinary and party action has also been taken against Captain N. Kuzema, Captain A. Lantushenko and Captain Yu. Kulikov. Senior Lieutenant of Medical Service N. Karpenko, secretary of the party organization, was relieved of his duties. The detachment has been strengthened with cadres. The district political directorate and the political section of the district construction directorate have assumed special control over the process of eliminating the deficiencies.

Steps which get to the heart of the matter have in fact been taken, but it would also be a good thing if the steps were reported to the editors without delays or reminders.

We cannot yet report to the readers on steps taken following the article "A Matter of Principle," printed on 30 April. It discussed gross misjudgements in the selection and placement of cadres in the construction directorate of the Volga Military District. We are into the third month of waiting. This strange forgetfulness, to put it mildly, is surprising.

All of this is contrary to the party's demands, which require prompt and principled response to criticism in the press--and within the time periods set by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. A reminder: a reply regarding steps taken must be sent to the editorial office within 30 days following publication of the criticism. If additional time is needed to take action, the editorial office should be informed.

Any other treatment of articles in the press does not benefit the cause.

#### Waste, Inefficiency in Flight Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jul 86 p 2

[Response by Col. A. Kalmykov, Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District, under the rubric "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Spoke Out: Answers, Responses, Results": "A Pencil or a Computer?"]

[Text] The article by Colonel General of Aviation A. Borsuk, "Economics of Training Flights," published on 29 April, caused me to do a lot of thinking. I must respond to it. It seems to me that some of the economic problems need to be further discussed.

Take, for example, the problem of training pilots at military air schools. It is a known fact that after completing a school, the specialist arrives in the unit with a higher education but that at the present time he cannot be expected to begin producing at once. Time, certain effort on the part of the commanders and the expenditure of large amounts of material resources are required in order for the school graduate to become a real combat pilot.



In my opinion, one of the causes of this is the squandering of efforts at the school. As a rule the cadets fly several different types of aircraft at the school. Would it not be better to master just one, but master it thoroughly? They are also "averaged" and depersonalized to a large degree: the outstanding individual and the one who has received "threes" appear the same from their records. But why not, let us say, permit the best to take the test for a class rating at the school? This would require very few additional outlays, but then the unit would receive a skilled pilot.

The article by Colonel General of Aviation A. Borsuk discusses the need to get more out of the time allocated for flight preparation and improve control. What, in my view, needs to be done in order for this not to remain just a good intention? It seems to me that we need to relegate to the archives the notebooks in which various kinds of documents are automatically copied and to turn over to the children the colored pencils and the (flomastery) with which the pilots draw the same graphs and diagrams dozens of times. These items must be replaced with a personal computer.

The matter of using the simulator equipment is a very acute one. As a rule it is single-channel in the regiments today. We need more of those simulators which make it possible to work out on the ground models of future air battles for a flight or even a squadron. How much fuel and how much service life of the expensive equipment could be saved!

I want to specially mention the planning of flights. The author of the article says that "compiling a good plan is only half the job." But those "half-jobs" take up so much of the commanders' time and effort that there is almost none left for the main work. Today, the planning charts are compiled the "old-fashioned" way. The initial data are stored only in the brains of the commanders and in notebooks. Microcomputers could resolve the lion's share of the problems which arise in the compiling of planning charts.

Today, displays and minicomputers are being used in the secondary school and in the vocational and technical education system. So it is time to provide the air commanders with as many of these as they need. This could alter the very nature of the work performed by commanders and staffs, by all of the personnel, and make it more efficient and economical. It would eliminate the need to keep a large number of special "artists," those who presently work day and night, copying planning charts and drawing all sorts of graphs and diagrams. It would become possible to automate the process of recording the results of the combat training, from the subunit to the district Air Forces, and reduce the number of people required to inspect, check, clarify, explain and so forth. All of this would make the training process more economical.

#### Loss of Messhall Supplies

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jul 86 p 2

[Report by Maj Gen I. Papelkov, deputy chief of the Central Food Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, under the rubric "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Spoke Out: Answers, Responses, Results": "Order Has Increased"]

[Text] The explanation with the title "Who is Responsible for the Dishes?," published on 22 March, was discussed in the Central Food Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and acknowledged to be correct. Appropriate changes will be made in the directives. The specialists estimate that this will considerably reduce losses of dishes and other messhall supplies and provide full restitution for losses incurred through the fault of servicemen.

The food service chiefs of the military districts, groups of forces and fleets were instructed long ago to take steps to bring order to the storage and use of messhall supplies and to increase the responsibility of those in charge and the daily duty details for their safekeeping. The newspaper article was discussed at assemblies of food service officers and in the military units. When necessary (as in the case of the Far East Military District, the Transcaucasus Military District, the Southern Group of Forces, the Black Sea Fleet and elsewhere), regulations governing the acceptance and the transfer of dishes and other supplies to members of the daily duty detail have been defined more precisely.

Losses of dishes have recently dropped in a number of units (by 40 percent in the Southern Group of Forces and by 28 percent in the Transcaucasus Military District), which indicates that the steps taken have been effective.

#### Assignment Not Consistent With Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jul 86 p 2

[Letter from reader and commentary by Col O. Tsarev, worker with Organization and Planning Directorate for Capital Construction of USSR Ministry of Defense, under the rubric "Letter and Commentary": "How Much Retraining Can There Be?"]

[Text] Respected Editor: Prior to serving in the army I completed a DOSAAF school with excellence as a trained electrician for mobile electric power plants. I counted on serving in my field of training, but I ended up at a school for junior specialists for construction units, where I studied to be a plumber. Well, I decided, there must be a greater need for plumbers at military construction sites. I studied conscientiously and was outstanding in the combat and political training.

Much to my surprise, after completing the training I was sent to... a timber combine, to procure lumber. Much as I would like to, I cannot use by skills as an electrician here, and certainly not my plumbing skills.

Just why, one asks, was so much time and money spent on my training at the two schools? I need not have complained, of course: the skills I acquired will come in handy in life. If one thinks about it, however, the situation is suffering somewhere because there is no competent electrician or plumber.

Junior Sergeant V. Vinogradov

1 November 1986

At the request of the editorial office, Colonel O. Tsarev, a worker with the Organization and Planning Directorate for Capital Construction of the USSR Ministry of Defense, comments on the letter.

The case reported by Junior Sergeant V. Vinogradov, military construction worker, seems insignificant at first glance. Imagine, one person is not being used in his field. However, it actually reflects a lack of concern for enhancing the skills of military construction workers and their subsequent use, which exists in certain organizations and units.

The matter of improving the system of job training for these specialists is of paramount importance today, however. Precisely therein lies one of the most significant reserves for increasing labor productivity and improving the work performed at military construction sites.

Large outlays of time and funds are required to learn any occupation. This is why it is so important to precisely assess the need for specific specialists and carefully study the kind and the level of training possessed by the young military construction workers who arrive.

Unfortunately, proper attention and thought are still not being given to this matter at the sites, which is what happened in the case of the letter-writer. Workers with the Main Construction Industry Directorate of the Ministry of Defense have now taken proper steps, and the blunder has been rectified. Junior Sergeant V. Vinogradov, military construction worker, has been appointed chief of an electric power plant, which is in his main field of specialization.

I would also like to note that the development of a comprehensive program for thoroughly renewing the job training of military construction workers has been completed in the Organization and Planning Directorate with the participation of the main construction directorates of the Ministry of Defense. It includes the creation of modern training facilities for the training subunits and their provision with technical training equipment and standard sets of specialized tools. The training programs have been revised to enhance the role of practical training in the consolidation of solid production skills. Also contributing to this will be the creation of a system of trainers, the plan for which has been developed by the Leningrad Higher Military Engineering Construction School imeni Army General A.N. Komarovskiy.

In short, it is planned within the next few years to significantly raise the skills level of military construction workers and to increase their output. And of course, to eliminate the kind of blunders discussed in the letter.

#### Poorly Trained Meteorologists

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jul 86 p 2

[Letter from Capt Yu. Kuchayev, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, under the "Letters to Editor" rubric: "Where Are We Getting the Half-Trained Ones?"]

Respected Editor: I have served in a meteorological subunit in air regiment "X" for more than 20 years. I shall not say a lot about how important it is for the

airmen to know as accurately as possible what kind of weather is expected during a flight shift. The work safety of the military pilots depends upon the correctness of the forecast.

Fightingmen arrive in the regiment from training subunits which train junior meteorologists. For a number of years now, the first thing which strikes one is their poor theoretical training. There is nothing to be said about their practical training or their skills in operating the equipment. These are lacking. It is necessary to begin training these "specialists" in the unit from scratch: to teach them the synoptic code, explain how to make weather observations, and so forth. An average of 2-3 months is spent completing their training. The airman does not become a specialist who can be trusted to work on his own until approximately 6 months after he has completed the training subunit. You will agree that this is a completely inefficient use of training time and funds, and unjustified wear on the equipment. Furthermore, intense flight work is underway in the regiment during this time, and every meteorologist is needed.

I shall attempt to illustrate why this occurs with a specific example. Private M. Dazhadayev arrived in our unit from a training subunit in the Belorussian Military District. The papers certifying that he had completed the school were signed by a Major Olendarenko (no initials were given). The soldier properly arrived in a new uniform, and his appearance was in conformity with the regulations in every respect. He had a certificate stating that Private M. Dazhadayev had completed the training in the training subunit on 7 April 1986 with a grade of "good," and the certificate of a rated specialist. These documents signed by Olendarenko were complete "forgeries," however. The soldier admitted that he had trained in his specialty around a month and had spent the rest of the time driving the commander's vehicle. When it came time to graduate, he did not even attend the exams. The commander told him something like the following in parting: "They'll train you when you get to the unit. The chief of the regimental weather service has a lot of time."

We will indeed teach the training subunit graduate his military specialty. I can assure you that Private M. Dazhadayev will begin performing his duties in 2 months. But we are being forced to correct a deficiency which, it seems to me, is the result of formalism in the work performed with the men in the training subunit and of irresponsibility on the part of certain people in charge.

I have a specific suggestion. It would be better to train rated weather specialists right in the regiment immediately after they are inducted than to finish up the training of half-trained individuals who have wasted several months of their service. This would be far less expensive, and the training would be considerably better. Every weather station chief would train specialists for his own service. And he would not tolerate the kind of formalism which exists in that training subunit.

#### Abuse of Service Position

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jul 86 p 2

[Follow-up on letter, by Col G. Ivanov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "On the Trail of a Letter": "What Lies Behind the Formal Reply?"]



[Text] The letter to the editor told how Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) P. Zamryga, who once served as deputy Fergana city military commissar, had taken advantage of his service position for personal gain. Among other things, he provided his father-in-law with a two-room apartment out of the city military commissariat's housing fund. He himself received a three-room apartment instead of the two-room apartment he was supposed to have. He also began building a spacious home outside of Fergana.

The editorial office sent the letter to the Military Commissariat of the Uzbek SSR with a request to look into the matter and take steps to put things into order. A reply soon arrived. Colonel A. Rubeko, chief of the political section of the Uzbek SSR Military Commissariat, reported that he had sent the complaint to the Fergana Oblast Military Commissariat to be checked out and for action to be taken.

Not a word was heard from there, however. Where and how had the letter been misplaced? I set out on its trail to answer this question.

"The republic military commissariat receives many letters through various channels," Colonel Rubeko complained. "Officers from the political section cannot travel to the site to check out each one. We therefore sent the letter to Lieutenant Colonel Tkachenko, chief of the political section of the Fergana Oblast Military Commissariat. For some reason, however, he did not reply...."

And so, the republic military commissariat washed its hands of the letter, one might say, claiming "objective" reasons. And what was done at the lower level?

I did not find Lieutenant Colonel I. Tkachenko at the Fergana Oblast Military Commissariat. He had left on a long temporary-duty assignment. What he had done about the letter was in evidence, however. It consisted in setting up a group of three individuals headed by Major V. Golub to check out the facts. The group existed only on paper, though. Major Golub was actually working by himself. He had sent requests to two places--the rayon billeting unit and the OBKhSS [Section for Combatting Embezzlement of Socialist Property]--for verification of the legality of Zamryga's acquisition of construction materials. He felt that he had done his job with that.

And so, Colonel Rubeko's actions were duplicated, one might say, in the oblast military commissariat. Furthermore, the requests sent by Major Golub only gave the appearance of an investigation, since he knew that Zamryga had paid for the construction materials at the demand of the billeting unit. The machinations with the apartments now needed to be looked into. No one wanted to deal with this, however.

Zamryga had already earned a name as a person who needed to be carefully watched. Judge for yourselves. His father-, mother- and brother-in-law came to his place after selling their small home near Samarkand. Five months later they received a new apartment out of housing belonging to the city military commissariat, with which they had no connection.

"How could this happen?" people in the military commissariat asked with surprise. This is how. Zamryga registered all of the relatives in his own 2-room apartment.

His father-in-law was listed as his father, his mother-in-law as his mother, and his brother-in-law as his brother.... And these false documents were made up by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Zvyagin, who for some reason represented the housing commission of the city military commissariat all by himself. They were signed by Officer V. Zakharov, former city military commissar, who was subsequently appointed military commissar of Chardzhou Oblast. And the relatives moved into a separate apartment. Zamryga remained in the previous, two-room apartment. He soon replaced it by the same unconventional method with a three-room apartment, as we have already mentioned. This time the false documents were signed by Officer V. Baydak, acting city military commissar. In short, when one gets down to the real reasons for the formal reply, one concludes that it was not due to an overload of letters and work but to a disinclination on the part of workers in the oblast and republic military commissariats to look the truth in the eyes. And the truth is that Zamryga's superiors were unprincipled and looked after him.

Fearing the lessons of the truth and lacking principle, Colonel U. Muminov, chief of the republic military commissariat, and Colonel A. Rubeko, chief of the political section, also overlook other negative occurrences: For example, Sergeant D. Akhmedov, drafted the city of Tashkent, remained to serve right in the republic military commissariat. Furthermore, he enjoyed privileges not shared by the other soldiers and NCOs. Every Saturday, after mess, he went to his parents' house (the sergeant's father is the chairman of the State Committee for Prices of the Uzbek SSR), where he relaxed until late in the evening on Sunday. If he wanted to, he could go home to rest up at any hour on any day of the week, because he had a round-the-clock pass issued to him by the military commissar himself.

The military commissar gave privileges also to certain other draftees. Draftee A. Tursunkhodzhayev, son of the chief editor of the magazine SOVETSKIY UZBEKISTAN, was at first included in a group being sent to one of the subunits of the limited contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. The decision was suddenly reconsidered, and he was sent to a different, very peaceful location. And U. Khashimov, son of the manager of the republic military commissariat's messhall, could not be drafted into the military for more than a year by the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in Tashkent, because he too was listed among the "special cases," and the republic military commissariat would not give the "OK" to draft him.

Reports of abuses by certain officials in the republic military commissariat arrived in the district political directorate, but the actions of Communists Muminov and Rubeko were for some reason not assessed from a standpoint of principle. This too explains to some degree why certain officials substitute formal reports for the investigation of improper actions and specific work to establish order.

#### Misappropriation of Fuel, Cover-Up

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jul 86 p 4

[Follow-up on report: "'Behind a Departmental Wall': Going Back to What Was Printed"]

[Text] A critical report was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the above title on 23 January. It told about the abuse of his service position by Major A. Ivanov, range chief, and a lack of supervision over his activities by a number of officials. It told how, for a long time, large quantities, amounts above any norms, of expensive and extremely scarce fuel had been written off by means of fictitious documents, which went undetected by the auditors of various rear service agencies.

The editorial office received serious replies from Colonel A. Shcherbo, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Section of Pacific Fleet Air Forces, and Lieutenant Colonel of Justice G. Nosov, acting Judge Advocate of the Far East Military District. They were published in our newspaper on 30 April. We shall not repeat them but only mention the following. The replies confirmed that the facts presented in the report were in fact valid and that the guilty parties had been punished. They had made restitution for the loss in the amount of 5,653 rubles. Major Ivanov was discharged into the reserve and expelled from the CPSU, and criminal proceedings were initiated against him.

It appeared that all the "i's" had been dotted. After these replies had been published, however, the editorial office received a report signed by Colonel A. Levin. It stated the following: "The finances were audited" in the unit mentioned in the critical newspaper article. "The audit established the fact that the finance service of that unit did not transfer the money for the fuel and lubricants in 1984 and 1985. The correspondent's information... was not confirmed."

The report goes on to say that the finance service not only of the given unit, but of the Pacific Fleet in general, has nothing to do with the loss to the state discussed in the article. Incidentally, Colonel I. Radutnyy, chief of the finance service for the Pacific Fleet, asserts: "As of now (?) there is no basis for accusing the finance workers of willfully failing to monitor the finance and economic work of the former range chief... The fleet's fuel and lubricant service paid the bills at the tank farm."

But if there is such ideal order in all elements of the finance service, then why, in the first place, as Colonel A. Shcherbo reported to the editorial office, was Colonel I. Sagayduk, chief of the Finance Service for Pacific Fleet Air Forces, discharged into the reserve, and why was disciplinary action taken against Captain K. Morokhov, chief of the finance service for the given unit?

In the second place, if finance service auditors were competently, scrupulously and regularly monitoring the finance and economic activities of the range chief, then why was Ivanov able over a period of many years to squander materials with cynical openness, before the eyes of many people, with impunity? In our opinion, it was because workers with the Finance Service for the Pacific Fleet did not take timely and necessary steps in their area of responsibility to establish strict order in record-keeping and to resolutely eliminate the lack of control, mismanagement and waste which existed in the subunit.

And then there is the following. The editorial office received a document from the Maritime Kray Office of the State Bank of the USSR, dated 24 April. Comrade Ya. Dobryanskaya, chief of the city directorate, reports that "payments of 2,200, 1,600 and 180 rubles and 60 kopecks were made out of the account (the

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account of the Finance Service of the Pacific Fleet is named) on 8 February, 26 July and 20 September 1985 on the basis of demands for payment Nos. 2, 4 and 5, by payer (the number of the unit audited by Colonel A. Levin and his subordinates is named). The tank farm which was discussed in the critical report and whose bills, according to Colonel I. Radutnyy, were paid only by the fuel and lubricant service, is named in the demands for payment as the recipient of the money.

The document automatically raises the question of what motivated the pen of officials with the Pacific Fleet Finance Service. Was it a desire to shift their own failures and their own guilt onto other services--that is, to protect themselves once again by erecting a departmental wall? Was it pride? A desire to go against the facts to protect the famous "honor of the uniform"? It is difficult to answer this question. One can say with certainty only that there is no sign even of an attempt to scrutinize one's own work critically and with party-mindedness in the letters. The authors do not attempt to reveal the true causes of what happened in order to be able in the future to take prompt steps to reveal and eradicate abuses like those for which former range chief A. Ivanov was severely punished. The replies signed by Colonels I. Radutnyy and A. Levin can therefore be called formal responses.

#### Unlawful Deferment to Attend Institute

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jul 86 p 2

[Article follow-up: "Another's Fault: A Drawn-Out Affair Which It Is Time to Settle at Last"]

[Text] "The Collapse of Patronage" was the title of a critical report by Major V. Svetikov, a contributor to the newspaper, published on 29 June 1985. It discussed the improper behavior of Captain 1st Rank (now Reserve) G. Repashevskiy in getting his son admitted to an institute. The Political Directorate of the Black Sea Fleet and the Gagarinskiy Rayon party committee responded to the report, about which the newspaper informed the readers on 17 October of last year.

When we published the reply we pointed out that the appropriate officials from the Odessa Military District had not properly assessed the actions of workers in the Crimean Oblast Military Commissariat who gave draftee Repashevskiy a deferment without any grounds. Only after a reminder did the editorial office receive a reply with the signature of Major General A. Gudkov, first deputy chief of the district political directorate.

It reported that the facts presented in the report had been checked out by Colonel V. Dubrovin, first deputy chief of the district political directorate's personnel department. The fact was established that draftee Repashevskiy's father had indeed appealed to Colonel A. Petrosyan, chief of the political section and Lieutenant Colonel L. Sergiyenko, section chief in the oblast military commissariat, to give his son a deferment so that he could enter an institute. They did not do so, however, explaining that the draftee was not entitled to a deferment.



The reply stated that the only fault of workers in the oblast commissariat was that they had not adequately supervised the Gagarinskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in the city of Sevastopol, which was under their authority. Major N. Orashaka, department chief, and Soviet Army employee V. Kryzhanovskiy, his senior assistant, had been negligent there.

The report went on to say that strict steps had been taken. Lt. Col. I. Baturin, rayon military commissar, was disciplined. Major General P. Kazarin, Crimean Oblast military commissar, and Colonel A. Petrosyan, chief of the political section, were sternly admonished.

And how did the judge advocate's office react to this? What occurred was given the same sort of assessment in a letter signed by Colonel of Justice V. Yaroshenko, judge advocate at the Simferopol Garrison.

It appeared that workers in the rayon military commissariat headed by Lieutenant Colonel I. Baturin were to blame for it all, and not Colonel A. Petrosyan and Lieutenant Colonel L. Sergiyenko, as the newspaper had stated. But it was none other than Lieutenant Colonel Baturin who reported that draftee R. Repashevskiy was evading the draft, that a number of papers had disappeared from his personal file. Baturin did not know at that time that some kind fellows in the oblast military commissariat had given the draftee a deferment. He suffered as a result of his principled stance, so to speak.

The editorial office once again sent a correspondent to the same locations. The validity of the facts and conclusions contained in the article "The Collapse of Patronage" was fully confirmed. This was borne out also by a letter subsequently received, signed by Lieutenant General V. Plekhanov, chief of the Political Directorate of the Odessa Military District. He had personally confirmed and evaluated the facts from a standpoint of principle. At his decision, Colonel A. Petrosyan has been recommended for discharge into the reserve. The penalty imposed upon Lieutenant Colonel Baturin by the oblast military commissariat was rescinded as illegal.

It took a long time, as we can see, to lift the accusation from Rayon Military Commissar Baturin. The lesson to be learned from this case is the following: The greatest of scrupulousness is required when it is a matter of making assessments of an individual, of determining his guilt or lack of guilt, and this is what Colonel V. Dubrovin and Lieutenant Colonel of Justice N. Chernyy did not demonstrate. As deputy judge advocate for the Simferopol Garrison (he has now been promoted), the latter sharply criticized Lieutenant Colonel Baturin from the speaker's platform at a meeting of the party aktiv of the oblast military commissariats for infractions with which he had nothing at all to do. During a meeting with the newspaper correspondent, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Chernyy said that it would be difficult to determine the truth, since many papers had been removed from R. Repashevskiy's personal file. So that's the way it is: it is difficult to determine the truth but takes nothing to publically criticize [people]. This is strange logic.

Justice, principle and consideration for people are not abstract concepts. We are persistently reminded of this by the party as it orients the cadres and all of the Communists toward the reorganization. And these are not just features of a work style, but a matter of our morality.

## Improved Engineering Training Needed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jul 86 p 2

[Response by Col V. Merkushev, candidate of technical sciences, docent, under the rubric "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Spoke Out: Replies, Responses, Results": "An Experiment is Needed"]

[Text] "The Prestige of the Military Engineer" was the title of an article by Colonel A. Malyakin, Candidate of Technical Sciences and Docent, published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 12 April. It raised question having to do with enhancing the prestige of the engineer's labor and improving the training of military engineers. The readers who responded to it suggest that the subject be discussed more extensively.

We are printing one of the responses today.

What must the engineer be in the era of accelerated scientific and technical progress? The answer to this question is provided in the plan for restructuring the higher school: capable of supporting revolutionary reforms in the equipment, the technology and the organization of production, and the growth of labor productivity many times over. Such are the rigorous demands. With specific adjustments, they fully apply also to the military engineer.

Let us think over that idea: capable of supporting revolutionary reforms. But just where, at what level, is it possible to bring out this ability in an individual who has decided to become an engineer? Obviously, it must be primarily in the training process, in the assimilation of the program designed to shape a specialist. This is why Colonel A. Malyakin's suggestion that we switch to training engineers and technicians in two stages deserves consideration.

The first two years of training should be based on a common program. After that, when it is clear who is who and what he is capable of, there should be a separation. The most capable of the cadets, those who have demonstrated an inclination for technical creativity and have successfully mastered the program of study, should be given the opportunity to study in a program for training military engineers. The rest should go into an accelerated program for training technicians.

It would hardly be expedient to introduce such a system at once, of course. It should be tested in an experiment--at one or two schools, for example.

## Educational Reform Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jul 86 p 2

[Letter from Col N. Borodin, candidate of technical sciences and docent, Kaliningrad Higher Engineering School of Engineer Troops imeni A.A. Zhdanov, under the rubric "The Higher School: Ways to Improve it": "Who is to Set the Tone?"]

[Text] The draft of the CPSU Central Committee's "Main Directions for Restructuring Higher and Specialized Education in

the Nation" is being actively discussed at military educational institutions. This fact is demonstrated by the vast amount of mail being received in the editorial office.

We are publishing some of the letters.

The Main Directions stress the fact that the quality of the training and indoctrinal process is determined primarily by the staff of professors and instructors. And no matter what aspects of the military school's improvement we consider, real restructuring, I am convinced, must begin with an improvement in the qualitative makeup of the scientific educational cadres, with the enhancement of their professional competence. There is no need to look for reserves from somewhere outside. They exist at each VUZ, in each department, in practically every one of us.

Here is a typical example. We analyzed one of the classes, which, incidentally, was conducted by a senior instructor. And what was our conclusion? The material could have been presented by the problem-solving method. The main topic should have been considered according to the principle "from the general to the specific" (in addition to everything else, this would have saved 10-15 minutes of training time). The instructor did not take into account the knowledge acquired by the cadets from the general scientific disciplines and therefore repeated what they already knew. Also a waste of time.

Today, there is no doubt in anyone's mind that it is very important to master the active forms and methods of teaching and adopt them in the daily praxis in order to improve the training of the future officers: presentation of the material in the form of problems to be solved, the staged development of knowledge and abilities, reference signals, military games, and so forth. Then why are they being adopted so slowly? I see it as being caused by one thing: a disinclination on the part of certain instructors to take on the extra work.

I have heard instructors say more than once that there are no practical recommendations for applying the new training methods. We have now developed them, however, and conducted demonstration classes. And what has been the result? Individual enthusiasts have come to the fore. The rest continue to conduct the classes as they did in the past.

Not everyone is capable of beginning to use new things immediately, of course. Some of the young instructors simply lack the experience. The older instructors should and are even obligated to do so, however. Who, if not they, the most experienced and self-prepared pedagogues, frequently with academic degrees, are to be the creators and active agents of new things?

I believe that it has now become necessary to set more rigid criteria to be met by the senior instructor, to enlarge his rights and duties, primarily in methodological supervision and the monitoring of every class. And with this in mind, to man the positions with the best and most talented officers-and-instructors, those with a feeling for new things, with a desire to work creatively and with initiative. We can no longer accept a situation in which the position of senior instructor has essentially become just a step up the ladder to a higher rank.

Primarily in the senior instructors I see a real force capable of placing the entire training and indoctrinational process at the VUZs onto the rails of progressive training forms and methods within the shortest possible period of time.

Considering the importance of this category of instructors, it would make sense to provide for awarding the best of them the academic titles of professors and docents for making a large contribution to the training and indoctrination of the future specialists.

#### The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Mailbag

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 86 p 2

[Text] The editorial office received 11,443 letters from readers in July of 1986. A total of 300 were published in the newspaper. There were 526 responses to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA articles.

Letters indicating the readers' approval of decisions coming out of the 27th party congress and the June 1986 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee continued to arrive in July. The authors write about the large amount of work undertaken in the new manner in the forces to implement the party's plans and about the reorganization. This is also true of most of the mail telling about the combat training: tactical exercises, flights and ocean cruises.

For example, Lieutenant Colonel L. Krivenkov writes from the Transcaucasus Military District: "The course toward intensification of the classes and the organization of effective socialist competition is producing good results in the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel S. Stepanov, master of combat skills. It was precisely this, along with other factors, which recently enabled the missile subunit to perform practice combat firings with an excellent evaluation. The battalion was listed on the range Honor Board by order of the senior chief. Senior Lieutenant D. Belyutkov, Warrant Officer V. Tkachev, Sergeant A. Mikhaylov and Junior Sergeant N. Plechiy were among those who distinguished themselves. The latter two were recently awarded the medal "For Excellence in the Military Service," 2nd degree.

Captain-Lieutenant B. Bayshukanov, master of military affairs and commander of a signal subunit on a missile cruiser, is making his 8th long ocean cruise. And each time, his subordinates have been given the highest rating for their performance. Senior Lieutenant A. Volkov, who reported this to the editorial office, emphasized the fact that this exercise took place in stormy weather, in a situation of powerful interference. This time as well, however, the signalmen confirmed the fact that their collective deserves to hold the title of an excellent subunit.

Captain Yu. Rubtsov wrote from the North Caucasus Military District about Colonel P. Melnik's work style. The collective headed by this officer and former front-line fighter has been acknowledged as outstanding for 14 years in a row. The personnel are constantly oriented toward a search for new approaches in the work. Next to the front-line Order of Glory, 3rd degree, Colonel P. Melnik deservedly wears the orders "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," 2nd and 3rd degrees, on his chest.



The editor's mailbag contains many such letters. It is a noteworthy fact that many of them single out, along with professionalism, strictness and principle, such a feature as closeness to the personnel and concern for subordinates. Lieutenant S. Stichko writes with gratitude from the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, for example, about Lieutenant Colonel V. Klimentyev, from whom he and the other young officers in the unit take their example in all things. "The senior comrade's personal qualities," the political worker writes, "tend to draw people to him. They know that he will not brush them aside, that he will hear them out, get to the bottom of their problem, help them.... It is pleasant to realize that I met just such a person at the beginning of my service."

Unfortunately, as the letters to the editor indicate, there are also cases of a different kind. For example, military construction workers wrote from the Leningrad Military District about how arrogantly, sometimes rudely, Captain Golovkin, commander of their company, treats his subordinates. Appeals to higher authorities have changed little in the officer's behavior. We sent this and other, similar letters to the proper authorities with a request that they look into the situations and take steps. The editorial board also plans to publish more articles on interrelations in the military collectives.

Typical of the July mail were letters telling about the Soviet people's devotion to the homeland, about the patriotism and the willingness to be there where it is most difficult and dangerous. For example, Private A. Ryashentsev of the Volga Military District, Private First Class A. Shcherbinin and Private V. Yekhlakov of the Transbaykal Military District and many other draftees have asked the editorial office to help them be assigned to the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Such acts cannot help evoking pride in the Soviet youth.

As in past months, many readers have reported sending money orders to the people of Chernobyl and expressed their preparedness to go to the nuclear power plant to help mop up after the accident. Colonel I. Bogatskiy of the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Major S. Nugayev of the Leningrad Military District, Guards Privates L. Gorelchikov, V. Mazurenko, V. Stygu and S. Shklyaruk of the Belorussian Military District and many others have written about this. These letters are further proof of the unity of the army and the people.

#### Malfeasance in Footwear Combine

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Aug 86 p 2

[Report under the rubric "Following a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Article": "An Old Model Pertaining to More Than Just Footwear"]

[Text] The above was the title of a report by Captain Yu. Mamchur, published in the newspaper on 30 May. It discussed shortcomings in the performance of the consumer service combine of one of the military trade organizations in the Black Sea Fleet.

Major General N. Sadovnikov, chief of the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, reported to the editorial office that steps have been taken to

correct the shortcomings which were found. A. Veliyeva, director of the consumer service combine, has been relieved of her position. Administrative and party penalties have been imposed upon Master Shoemaker V. Malyshev for making products for under-the-counter sale. V. Selivanov, chief of the military trade organization, his deputy for political affairs P. Baranov, and Ye. Lotash, head of the workshop, were issued stern reprimands for poor supervision of the consumer service combine's operation and for serious deficiencies in the organization of the footwear shop's performance.

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## NAVAL FORCES

### MILITARY USE OF SEAPORTS BY U.S. DISCUSSED

Moscow MORSKOY FLOT in Russian No 4, 1986 pp 59-61

[Article by V. Sokolov under the rubric "At the Helm": "Seaports in the Pentagon's Plans"]

[Text] The United States began the stage of imperialism as the most industrially developed power but one "deprived" of its colonies. From the very first, American imperialism therefore became the most aggressive force in the world arena and engaged in a campaign to reshape the world. Its expansionistic aspirations were not limited to neighboring countries. Its aggressive actions extended to areas located far away, across seas and oceans, many thousands of kilometers distant from the North American continent. In addition to combat ships, vessels of the merchant fleet were extensively used in these actions.

Back in the last century American Admiral A. Mahan developed the so-called "theory of sea power," which was essentially the following: by creating a powerful navy, the USA could achieve superiority at sea, seize control of world trade and then become the master of the situation in the world. The theory developed by Mahan, who became the idol of American militarists, served for many years as the basis of the aggressive naval doctrines which determined U.S. policy both in the organizational development of its naval forces and in the field of shipping.

The USA's contemporary naval doctrine is a further development of Mahan's "theory of sea power." It is based on this aggressive formula: "Supremacy in the world is impossible without supremacy at sea."

The American strategists include in the concept "sea power," along with such elements as the naval and merchant fleets, the system of seaports. The Pentagon plans to use in the wars it is planning, not only its own seaports, from which it is planned to dispatch expeditionary forces, weapons and supplies for them to overseas theaters of military operations, but also ports belonging to other nations and located in areas of possible deployment of American troops. Furthermore, for those parts of the world where for one reason or another the American armed forces cannot count on ports being made available for unloading purposes, the USA is engaged in the intensive development of means and methods for unloading vessels on unprepared shores and is creating special units and subunits for the rapid deployment and operation of such transfer complexes. Within the framework of the aggressive policy aimed at gaining supremacy in the world, seaports are increasingly being considered as bases for combat ships of the USA.

This militaristic approach is manifested, among other ways, in the fact that the USA is taking a number of organizational steps to enhance the readiness and ensure the uninterrupted operation of seaports, both its own and those belonging to its allies in the aggressive blocs, prior to and during a war. The U.S. Defense Department is constantly expanding and improving the developed system of port authorities.

The American military press has reported that the Pentagon controls 24 seaports which have been declared "national defense ports." Special berths at the ports have been designated for loading troops, weapons, ammunition and supplies. Ocean terminals at the Oakland, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, Canaveral, New Orleans, Seattle, Wilmington, Mobile, Beaumont and certain other ports are under constant supervision. Sunny Point, a port on the Atlantic coast of the USA specialized for shipping out ammunition, is also at the Pentagon's disposal. At the announcement of mobilization it is planned to immediately turn over to the U.S. Defense Department 54 general-cargo berths (12 of which are of the ro-ro [rolkernyy] type) at 21 ports and another 21 container berths at 13 ports if additional need arises.

A special water terminal service has been set up to control military shipments through seaports. It has subdivisions not only in the USA, but also in Panama, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Bahrain, the FRG, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Great Britain, on the island of Diego Garcia and in the Philippines. The most highly developed system of U.S. military port agencies abroad has been established in Western Europe.

Planning for the unleashing and the conduct of a war against the Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth nations, the Pentagon attaches special importance to the West European ports. It is planned to deliver operational and strategic reserves, weapons, ammunition, fuel and other kinds of supplies to the continent from the USA, Canada and Great Britain through these ports. The coasts of Belgium and the Netherlands as well as the western part of the FRG's coast are regarded as the main unloading area in Western Europe. This area, located in direct proximity to the area described at NATO headquarters as the main zone of combat operations in the central part of Europe, has the greatest concentration of port capacities. Highly developed ports are concentrated on this section of the coast, which account for as much as one third of the maritime cargo traffic in the region. Even in peacetime the American command makes extensive use of the ports of Belgium, the Netherlands and the FRG for provisioning its troops.

The U.S. military port agencies in Western Europe are united into a transport terminal command headquartered in Rotterdam. It controls terminals at the ports of Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, Felixstowe, Liverpool, Livorno, Barcelona and Lisbon, which are staffed; terminals at the ports of Barry, Greenock, Grangemouth, Southampton, London, Zeebrugge, Bremen, Hamburg, Nordenham, Amsterdam and Antwerp, which are manned as the need arises; and transport terminal units at the ports of Cadiz, Istanbul, Izmir, Iskenderun and Piraeus. The American military thus has port complexes under its control in practical all the West European NATO nations with egress to the sea, and in general it controls a vast port system which extends beyond the continent and stretches more than 5,000 miles. And the degree of U.S. control over the ports of partners in the bloc is constantly growing.



The content of secret agreements signed in 1983 between Great Britain and the USA recently became known. Under the agreements the British Isles would become the main transshipment base between the USA and Europe in "emergencies." Along with airfields, the Pentagon would assume authority over the seaports of a nation which not so long ago called itself with imperial obstinacy "the ruler of the waves." The American Army would have exclusive authority over its transport system, its economy and its labor resources.

Feeling at home in Western Europe, the American military command is enlarging its possibilities for off-loading an enormous amount of munitions for its troops at ports of its European NATO partners. West European advocates of peace have repeatedly come out against these dangerous weapons' being brought into and transported over their territory, but their demands have been ignored. The West German port of Nordenham has been selected as the main off-loading point for the munitions. From there the cargoes will be shipped by rail to depots or sent by water routes to the so-called "Rhine River Terminal." The latter is a part of the U.S. Transport Terminal Command in Europe and includes transshipment complexes and depots at Mannheim, Mainz, Bingen, Germersheim and other interior ports of the FRG. The American command is also working out alternative ways to deliver the munitions through the ports of Zeebrugge, Emden and Barry.

Pusan, where a large port unit of the U.S. Army is deployed, is the main American transshipment point in South Korea. The USA shipped around 3.3 million men and around 37 million tons of military freight through that port during the period of aggression in Korea.


The Pentagon has set up special reserve port units in recent years to ensure the uninterrupted passage of troops and military freight through its own seaports during the deployment of the armed forces and the conduct of a war. Eighteen of 22 such units are designated for ports on the nation's east coast. The units are manned with dock specialists who live near the ports. This makes it possible to rapidly mobilize. The reservists are called up for 2-week training assemblies each year. Regular participation in "Reforger" ("Return the Forces to Germany") exercises constitutes the highest form of training. These exercises, which have been conducted annually since 1967, require the shipment of a considerable quantity of military equipment across the Atlantic. It is loaded at the ports of Beaumont, Port Arthur and Norfolk, and is unloaded at Rotterdam, Ghent, Amsterdam and Antwerp.

The USA is devoting an equal amount of attention to the development of equipment for and the search for optimal methods of unloading transport vessels in areas unprotected or poorly protected against the waves. This work is being carried out under several programs. The main ones are LOTS (Logistics Over the Shore) and COTS (Container Off-Loading and Transfer System).

Under these programs the USA has developed several concepts for the roadstead unloading of vessels onto an unequipped shore. Special importance is attached to the problem of unloading container ships which do not have their own cranes. This is because the USA has a large fleet of these vessels, in addition to which it is planned to haul up to 80 percent of the military cargo in containers.

The Pentagon is giving precedence to the concept of rapid-deployment terminals, which are based on a floating crane for unloading the vessels. It is planned to


haul the floating cranes to the terminal deployment site on the only vessels suitable for the purpose: three Seabee lighters of the U.S. Merchant Marine. The American experts calculate that this means of delivering the cranes will make it possible to transport them over large distances at a speed of 20 knots, whereas the conventional towing speed does not exceed 5 knots.



#### Arrangement of a Tactical Sea Terminal

##### Key:

- |   |                       |
|---|-----------------------|
| 1. Mooring buoys                              | 5. Floats             |
| 2. Buoy for attaching the end of the pipeline | 6. Pumping station    |
| 3. Tanker                                     | 7. Pumping units      |
| 4. Floating pipeline                          | 8. Soft tanks         |
|   | 9. Fuel issuing units |



#### Unloading Ocean Container Ship With Crane Vessel (cross-section view)

##### Key:

- |                   |            |
|-------------------|------------|
| 1. Container ship | 3. Lighter |
| 2. Crane vessel   |            |

These capabilities do not satisfy the Pentagon, however. Brandishing the "big stick" at many nations and regions of the world arbitrarily declared to be

"zones of vital interest" of the USA, the American leadership is taking steps to provide extensive access from the sea to these regions by the Rapid Deployment Force specially created for this kind of invasion.

An extremely urgent program is therefore underway in the USA to convert 12 of the C-5 and C-6 container ships into special crane vessels. The program extends to the year 1988. The first two crane vessels have already been turned over to the Navy. Three pairs of 30-ton cranes with a 37-foot boom are mounted on the right side of each. Each crane can lift a 40-foot container of cargo. Working in tandem, the cranes can lift up to 60 tons (an M-60 tank, for example). Not satisfied with this vast program, the Pentagon is also making provisions for rapidly equipping new C-9 container ships with tracked cranes during a "crisis" to make it possible to unload them without the aid of quay or floating cranes.

It is planned to use conventional landing equipment, water-displacing lighters or air-cushion lighters for getting the cargo to shore in the case of roadstead unloading of container ships. It is the opinion of American experts that use of the latter will give the invasion forces an important advantage by eliminating the need to build moorage facilities. One of the air-cushion lighters, the LACV-30 has undergone testing and been accepted for use in the American Army. It has a carrying capacity of 30 tons and a speed of up to 40 knots. A similar lighter is being developed for heavier cargo.

Large-scale exercises involving the unloading of container ships by means of the first Keystone State crane vessel delivered to the Navy were conducted in the USA in September and October of 1984. A total of 4,000 people took part in the exercises, and 1,000 containers were transferred. Various floating equipment was used for delivering them to shore: LACV-30 air-cushion lighters, water-displacing lighters, landing equipment, self-propelled floating platforms and other equipment. The LACV-30 lighters performed best. The maximum unloading rate was 300 containers in a 24-hour period.

American military experts consider it most convenient to unload re-ro vessels not in the roadstead but at a temporary, rapidly built pier. The development and creation of sets of prefabricated elements for the rapid erection of such piers and ramps connecting the piers with the shore is therefore continuing.

In view of the extensive use of helicopters for unloading vessels in the roadstead during Great Britain's operation to capture the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in 1982 (MORSKOY FLOT, No. 11, 1982), the USA is engaged in further developing this method. It is the opinion of American military experts that the use of helicopters for unloading vessels will be justified in the logistical support of troops put onto shore during a landing operation and for unloading especially important and lightweight cargoes.

The press has reported on a fundamentally new concept being developed at an engineer laboratory of the U.S. Navy at Port Hueneme in California for the roadstead unloading of container ships. It involves developing a set of components for a prefabricated, suspended monorail to link a vessel standing in the roadstead with the shore. The sections of the monorail and the supports will be carried on the vessels. According to preliminary calculations, it will take 5-6 days to assemble a monorail 0.5 mile long, and it will take 5 minutes to build a

6-meter container that distance. The rail can be up to 2 miles long. The containers are suspended from spreaders, which are returned to the vessel on a parallel track.

The monorail container track will possibly have commercial importance and be used for delivering containers to coastal facilities which do not have a land link to the port.

The U.S. Army's Military Transport Control Command has developed the so-called "Standard Port Control System," the DASPS-E, which is installed on a trailer, for unloading containers. As the DASPS-E system is deployed in oversea theaters of military operations, it is linked to the network of the Military Transport Control Command's general military container shipment control system, which covers both domestic and foreign container shipments. Blocks corresponding to the transshipment points which the American military plans to set up on captured foreign shores are already being inserted into the general system.

A rapidly deployed system of equipment for delivering liquid fuel from tankers to an unprepared shore has been developed in the USA. It is transported on vessels and consists of two roadstead moorings with a set of pipelines and four pumping stations. In addition, an air-transportable set of equipment for setting up a tactical sea terminal has undergone testing and is designated for practical employment. The set of roadstead equipment includes pipelines, 42 soft fuel tanks with a capacity of 190 cubic meters each, eight pumps with a capacity of 136 cubic meters per hour and equipment for issuing the fuel. Plans call for the terminal to be deployed and operated by a port construction engineer company and a pipeline and shore depot operating company. The American magazine TRANSLOG names Africa, the Near East and Southeast Asia among the most likely areas of deployment of such terminals--that is, the regions against which the Rapid Deployment Force is directed.

The extensive preparations being conducted by the United States of America for a port system to support massive military shipments and the high level of activity in the development of equipment for deploying temporary port complexes on foreign shores are proof of the aggressive plans being hatched up by aggressive circles in the USA, plans which threaten peace. Today, Washington is attempting to provide these plans with a scientific-sounding cover in the form of the so-called "globalism" which is supposed to substantiate in advance some sort of "right" by the USA to intervene militarily in any region of the world. The policy of adventures being conducted by ruling American circles is evoking angry protest on the part of peace-loving forces and demands that we be particularly vigilant.

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## NAVAL FORCES

### REPORT ON SOVIET MULTINATIONAL SUBMARINE CREW

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Zotov, Red Banner Leningrad Naval Base, under the rubric "Our Multinational Military Collective": "The Crew is One Big Family"]

[Excerpt] The bay seemed to bend under the weight of the metal. In the middle, as though soldered to the gray water, stood a submarine.

When he learned the objective of my trip, the commander of the dispatch boat, a smiling young warrant officer immediately ordered the boat to be unmoored, and with two elegant tacks the boat was at the black side of the submarine.

"This is our namesake," the warrant officer said affectionately, "a multinational crew."

The seamen call the Komsomolets Kazakhstana "the Komsomol girl," as though talking about their beloved and not a combat ship. The submariners do indeed love their ship. They take good care of it, just as they safeguard the crew's good traditions.

"The submarine retained the title of excellent submarine for 18 years running," I was told by Senior Lieutenant I. Isakov, secretary of the crew's party organization. "Unfortunately, we lost it when the boat was being overhauled. The collective has committed itself to achieve it again this year, however. I am confident that we can do so. Our crew is not considered one of the most harmonious in the unit for nothing, after all."

Members of 12 nationalities serve on the ship. Some of the first-term seamen came under Komsomol authorization from various oblasts in Kazakhstan. They gained some dependable friends here. Petty Officer 1st Class Talgat Sabirbayev, young Communist and secretary of the ship's Komsomol committee, has good things to say about Petty Officer 1st Class Vasilii Yashshuk, his first mentor:

"The section commander has a lot of concerns, but there was never a case in which Vasilii refused to help. Even when he came off watch, he would work with us in our specialty instead of resting. Thanks to him, I became a specialist 1st class. And I am not the only one...."

The commander has seen to it for a long time that the veteran submariners on the crew assume responsibility for the newcomers. This tradition has become a sort of baton. Today, Sabirbayev is working to raise young seamen Abay Karazhigitov and Erik Sydykov up to his level. Things are especially difficult for Karazhigitov. The seaman never parts with his Russian language textbook, and his comrades give him lessons in grammar and spelling in their free time. Abay is at the center of attention when newspapers arrive on the submarine from Alma-Ata. There is lively discussion of news from Kazakhstan in the compartments. The news is learned by a Russian and a Belorussian, a Chechen and an Azerbaijani, a Moldavian and a Lezghin....

But it is not just newspapers which are the source of information about life in the nation, information so essential to every seaman. Evening discussions of special themes are periodically held for the crew: "In Our Compartment, We Have All the Republics"; discussions around a map of the homeland, "My Part of the Country in the 12th Five-Year Plan"; and all-ship meetings with those who have returned from leave. None of this is new. It is important that it not be conducted just for "checkmarks" but that it carry a large emotional charge.

"The Komsomol members," Isakov says, "volunteer to tell about their republic, oblast, city or village. And they always speak with pride of the labor successes of their fellow countrymen, of the gratifying changes occurring in the homeland, and are disappointed when things do not go the way they should. There are a lot of questions. Even questions like these: 'Why did you get a reprimand on watch?' or 'When are you ever going to become a specialist 1st class?' In other words, it is not enough just to tell about your republic. You need to serve in a manner for which you do not have to be ashamed before your fellow countrymen."

The party secretary knows everything, or almost everything, about every member of the crew.

"I am required to," Isakov says, smiling. "But then our seamen are not secretive. When new men arrive on the ship, the first thing we do is introduce them to the collective. We assemble in the Lenin Room, and there is a candid discussion. We learn every little thing about the person there. We determine right away what he needs to rid himself of and what requires special attention. How could it be otherwise? We are a family, after all, and a family must be harmonious. Then it can do anything."

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NAVAL FORCES

KAPITANETS INTERVIEW ON COMBAT READINESS, TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jul 86 p 1

[Interview with Adm I. Kapitanets, commander of the Northern Fleet, by Capt 2nd Rank S. Bystrov, editor of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Navy Combat Training Section, under the rubric "The Combat Training: Reserves for Acceleration": "The Effectiveness of the Cruise Mile"; date and place not given]

[Text] There are many ships of the Northern Fleet performing combat training missions in various areas of the World Ocean every day. The combat skill of the sailors is honed and improved and undergoes practical testing on the trips to sea and the long cruises. Admiral I. Kapitanets, commander of the Northern Fleet, talks about how questions of acceleration in the most important area of the daily life of the Northern Fleet sailors are resolved, in an interview with Captain 2nd Rank S. Bystrov, editor of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Navy Combat Training Section.

[Question] Comrade Admiral, the results of the work of the ships and formations are defined by many indices. Is there, however, a universal one which reflects the quality of the combat training and how up-to-date it is?

[Answer] Absolutely. It is the effectiveness of each combat training hour, of each mile traveled. We are talking about the gauge of our labor productivity, the efficiency with which the enormous funds are used and the quality of the final "product," which is the actual combat readiness of the fleet. We know the exact cost of every hour spent at sea by any ship. It is constant, but the result derived from that hour, from that mile traveled and from the money spent can vary. It is the most important task in the combat training of the fleet today, in the realization of actual acceleration, to learn how to achieve the maximum.

[Question] The large ASW ship Admiral Makarov is at sea right now. Can one say that the miles it travels will be adequately productive?

[Answer] This is just such a case in which that cannot be said. It is more an example of the incomplete use of possibilities. Today, such trips to sea by ships can no longer satisfy us even with a good performance in the execution of the training exercise. The Admiral Makarov went to sea for torpedo practice against an underwater target. That is, a submarine was specially activated for a

single firing. The formation and ship commanders will create some sort of additional, beneficial work for the crews, of course. If this firing had been fitted into an exercise or a joint cruise by a formation of ships, however, the Admiral Makarov would have been working not just for itself. Most important, it would have performed in a situation approaching actual combat. Each mile covered by the ship would then have been "multilevel"--that is, the command element and the crew would have had to perform several missions simultaneously, at an unbroken pace, and this would have been in a complex tactical setting, in the interest of the entire formation.

[Question] Meaning that it is more promising to practice combat exercises and other individual combat training missions on the scale of a detachment of ships?

[Answer] And more natural. Today, it is most frequently simply unprofitable for ships to operate individually in the combat training. What is the conflict? Individually, the ships have good indices for the combat training missions. When a formation goes to sea, however, the overall picture with respect to joint actions may be worse than expected. This is because the needed level of coordination has not yet been achieved, because the commanders are accustomed to operating primarily in the interest of their own ships, and their tactical thinking is not developing into operational thinking as it should. Furthermore, whether they want to or not, the staffs are pushing into the background their main mission of improving their skills in directing formations at sea, preparing an entire formation for cruises and supporting cruises by all of the forces as they support the fulfillment of a combat training plan for individual ships. And this is a matter of the level and the style of the staffs' work, which must be truly large-scale and fleet-oriented.

[Question] The Admiral Makarov's trip to sea will apparently make it possible to derive some lessons also in this respect?

[Answer] Yes. It has been reported to me that the formation commander went out as senior officer on the ship--that is, the flag officer went to sea. But is he functioning as a flag officer? What interests of the formation was he serving by leaving all of his other ships and going out on just one? In most such cases they say that it is to train the ship's commander. It is frequently wasteful use of one's work time, however, a matter of avoiding dealing with the main problems.

Incidentally, the Admiral Makarov is commanded by Captain 2nd Rank V. Pravilenko, who has many years of experience in commanding various ships. Is he not capable of handling matters pertaining to the training of his crew by himself? The formation commander, then, has gone to sea purely as a backup. The formation gains nothing from this. When the flag officer goes to sea, the results from every mile covered by the ships under his command must be especially great. This fact must be understood also by those who approve the plan for trips to sea by flag officers.

Here is another example. A group of ships headed by Captain 1st Rank A. Kovalchuk recently returned from a long, lengthy and very intensive cruise. The officer made a very thorough and substantive report on the results of the successful cruise. It was apparent just how much the flag officer had developed on a single cruise, how much his political and professional perspective had expanded and how much his ability to view his own specific functions from the standpoint of state interests had



increased. And the commanders came back with a different attitude. They were no longer locked into the affairs of their own ships, the "departmental focus" of their interests had disappeared, and they had learned to live and think on the scale of the group.

[Question] You have brought up questions of psychology. Apparently, the psychological attunement and the inner preparedness of the men are particularly important with respect to reorganizing the combat training on a more effective and intensive basis?

[Answer] Most frequently, this is crucial. Even with a high level of performance efficiency, if the men are not convinced that things must be done this way and no other, it is difficult to expect good results from them. It is therefore necessary first of all to develop the correct attitude toward the crucial problem, to achieve a readjustment of consciousness. The commanders, political organs and party organizations are devoting constant attention to this. Until the officer and the seaman are placed at the center of all our efforts with respect to the combat training, it will be difficult to speak with validity of an acceleration in this area of the fleet's work. Everyone talks as though he agrees, but this is not what is happening in reality. This is because there is no firm conviction that there can be nothing more important than the combat training during the time allocated for it. The fact must also be stressed that precisely organized combat training is an extremely important factor in the strengthening of military discipline.

The other day, the commanders of units whose officers had recently been apprehended by a patrol in the garrisons during classes in their specialty were called in to see my first deputy. Not everyone liked this. Because of some negligent lieutenant, they said, the unit commander is going to be taught a lesson. It was not because of a lieutenant but because of the need to alter their attitude and that of their subordinates toward the combat training, in which closeness to the men and demandingness of them must be at the fore, as they must be in all things. How is the "OK" sometimes given for our ships to go to sea? "Is all of the equipment in order?" the ship is asked. "The equipment is ready," comes the answer. And the departure is authorized. But what about the crew? The men are not always remembered.

Yes, the fleet is constantly receiving new and complex equipment and weapons. It takes an enormous amount of attention and effort to master and operate them. But it is people who master the equipment and in whose hands its possibilities are revealed, and the effectiveness with which it is used depends upon them. The people must therefore receive the main attention.

We recently relieved Captain 3rd Rank A. Korolev of his position as a ship's commander, and Captain 2nd Rank I. Pankrashkin was warned that he was not measuring up to his service position. The two commanders were severely penalized for indifference toward the men. How can we speak of a readjustment in such officers, when they are not fulfilling the regulation requirements or their service and party duty?

I want to mention once more Captain 1st Rank A. Kovalchuk, whom I have known a long time. He has given a good performance in all of his positions and always

cope successfully with all of his tasks. And his ability to work with people, his thoughtful and sincere handling of subordinates, is the main secret of his success. The reorganization in his combat training is therefore proceeding vigorously, and the results are clearly visible.

[Question] During the past few days I have had the opportunity to talk with the commanders of ships and formations and with staff and seagoing officers in the fleet. Not all of them are satisfied with the way the combat training tasks are being accomplished. They name numerous factors beyond their control.

[Answer] We know that such factors exist. Various organizational hitches sometimes arise due to deficiencies on the part of the staffs, and steps are being taken to eliminate them. However, I would like to underscore the fact that the reorganization, even in small things, requires considerably greater activeness on the part of everyone, requires determined effort and action. And it is not an easy matter to induce, to force, primarily oneself to work in the new and more vigorous way. "Objective" reasons are sought, and there are complaints that the necessary conditions are lacking. But we have to create the conditions ourselves. One thing is clear: the quality of the combat training must improve. Today, the results of every mile traveled by any of our ships at sea are measured by the level of intensification of the combat training achieved in the fleet.

11499

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NAVAL FORCES

NAVAL ECOLOGICAL PROTECTION MEASURES REPORTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Aug 86 p 1

[Report by Capt 3rd Rank I. Anfertyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "On Ecological Patrol"]

[Text] I heard of the ecological patrol for the first time when I was returning from a cruise on the ASW cruiser Minsk. The launch Tayfun, which took us on board, swept along the shore, cutting through the mirror-smooth surface of the bay. It suddenly slowed down.

"A preserve," Captain 2nd Rank S. Barnashov, chief of Pacific Fleet hydrometeorologists, said, motioning toward an island framed in luxuriant green. "Even lotuses grow there."

The launch gathered speed again, and the small island where the relict lotus blooms and which is listed in the Red Book took on new meaning in my mind. It is a "barometer" of the purity of the much-navigated bay.

"Recently," Captain 2nd Rank Barnashov said, "increasingly rigorous steps have been taken in the fleet to protect the environment. If you are interested, you can observe the ecological patrol in action."

And here I was on the patrol.

"There is an oil slick drifting toward the moorings." This was the hypothetical problem assigned Captain 2nd Rank A. Nazarenko, patrol chief, by Captain 1st Rank A. Loyko, fleet chief of staff for logistics. "A patrol helicopter is looking for the culprit. Your mission is to supervise the work of clearing up the contamination."

Before being appointed chief inspector for environmental protection, Captain 2nd Rank Nazarenko served many years on combat ships. He had spent the past 4 years as commander of the large landing ship Sergey Lazo. And so he knows very well how to operate the equipment competently. It is therefore not difficult for him to find a common language with the ship commanders and to give them real assistance.

Once, during a regular inspection, the patrol crew noticed that excessive bilge (oil-containing) water had accumulated on the large ASW ship Tashkent. The

commander complained about the difficulty of getting rid of this ballast. It turned out, however, that the officer had not considered the special station which accepts and purifies bilge water in unlimited quantities. Incidentally, the Tashkent was only a few cable lengths away from it that day.

And so, Captain 2nd Rank Nazarenko was to monitor the mop-up of the oil slick, and the mission was signed to the crews of surface ships. Our patrol arrived at the site.

Work was in full swing on the quay. The seamen were preparing special rigging to be set up. The bright orange floats could already be seen in certain parts of the bay. An oily film on the surface of the water localized the contamination. Collecting vessels were already cleaning it up.

The commander of the ship unit was directing the work of setting up the barriers. He was responsible for keeping the water clean there. He was accountable for this to the fleet's command element.

The patrol headed by Captain 2nd Rank Nazarenko inspected the area around the moorings. The officer inspected the surface of the water and recently collected debris. He asked hydrologist V. Filonenko about the nature and the speed of bottom and surface currents in the bay. All of this was essential in order to determine whether the seamen were taking the right steps. "We are counting on completing the job by evening," Captain 2nd Rank A. Shirokov, responsible for cleaning up the contamination, said. "It's not going to be easy, though...."

Captain 2nd Rank Shirokov's concern was understandable. The hypothetical situation was a difficult one, and he had only one collecting vessel, which did not operate very rapidly, at his disposal. Other, small floating craft were put into use in order to speed up the job.

"That's OK. We will soon solve that problem to some degree," Nazarenko said, sharing his plans. "The fleet command has given its support to our idea of equipping old vessels as collectors."

...At that time a small ASW ship was taking on fuel at the fuel berth. Even the critical inspection by the patrol revealed no violations, however. Captain 3rd Rank K. Levko, commander of the MPK [small subchaser], commented that order had been enhanced at the fuel berths in general over the past year. The fuel stations were being modernized and outfitted with modern equipment.

In general, the situation with respect to striving for environmental purity is improving markedly in the fleet, although, strange as it seems, the number of violators has increased somewhat. This is due to the fact that the slightest deviation from the regulations is now registered and made public. Unquestionably, however, the times demand that we increase our attention to problems of protecting the environment.

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NAVAL FORCES

NARRATIVE ON TORPEDO-FIRING EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jul 86 p 1

[Article by Lt A. Vasilenko, member of the Komsomol committee on a nuclear-powered submarine, Red Banner Pacific Fleet, under the rubric "The Baton of Komsomol Affairs": "Duel in the Ocean Depths"]

[Text] The crew of radioelectronic surveillance operators headed by Lieutenant O. Prokofyev isolated the main target in the chaos of noise from among the "enemy" targets for which D/F bearings were being taken. Several other blips appeared on the plan position indicator just as the operational disposition was about to be figured out.

"They are disturbingly polite," Lieutenant Prokof'yev said thoughtfully when we looked in on the sonar compartment.

The operators' tension was apparent from their damp, flushed faces. The day before the crew had committed itself not to miss a single target. The specialists were backing up their words with vigilant watches.

"Comrade Commander, the formation has unexpectedly split up," reported watch officer A. Salnik, whose combat shift was always in first place in the competition by task and norm.

"Unexpectedly, you say?" the commander of the nuclear-powered submarine asked him. Judging from everything, he had not only anticipated this maneuver but had even prepared several alternative responses to it.

The captain 2nd rank advised us to:

"Make the rounds of the compartments and stations. The fate of the Komsomol initiative to detect and destroy the targets at maximum range is being decided right now."

The submarine personnel remember well the Komsomol meeting at which Lieutenant S. Skurikhin, member of the ship's Komsomol committee, proposed increasing the range specified in the norms for detecting underwater targets. Some of the specialists had their doubts as to whether they were capable of this. Most of them supported Sergey, however. A person like him does not toss his words to the wind.

...The day after graduation, we saw our former OJT member on the pier where the nuclear-powered submarine was berthed. Not in a cadet's uniform, however, but wearing the brand-new shoulder-boards of a lieutenant.

"I have come to continue my service here," Skurikhin reported to the ship's commander.

"You have a leave coming," Captain 3rd Rank N. Makarov, political worker, who was standing next to them, explained.

"I'll have time to rest up," Lieutenant Skurikhin, graduate of the Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S.O. Makarov, said with conviction.

And he had earned the right to go on the long cruise. When his fellow cadets arrived on the nuclear-powered submarine later, the young officer had passed the tests and was already overseeing the signal equipment on his own.

Many members of the crew are in love with the nuclear-powered fleet. And walking around the ship during an exercise, one becomes graphically aware that every young officer has a sense of being not just the agent of the new tactical experience but also its creator.

The situation which developed in this exercise might have appeared hopeless in the past. Now, however, none of the specialists lost their confidence that the outcome of the battle would be in our favor. But all the efforts were now on seizing the initiative in the battle.

"One has to be able to find those atypical and singularly correct decisions," the commander frequently underscores during exercises and drills. These words inspire everyone to action, from the cooks in the galley to the duty personnel at the reactors.

"Readying reserve side for use," reported the commander of the electrical and engineering division, who was now beginning to foresee the further development of events from the dynamics of the situation.

"Keep the equipment ready for maximum duty," the captain 2nd rank ordered.

Now, at precisely the prescribed time, the nuclear reactor produced full power. Ahead lay an encounter with an "enemy" submarine. Boring through the gigantic bulk of the ocean depths with its propellers, the nuclear-powered submarine rushed toward the site of its duel. Lieutenant S. Laktionov, at the remote-control panel for the main power unit, carefully monitored the movement of the instrument needles and the lights on the monitoring instruments of the electrical and engineering division. The young commander of the control party had complete self-control. He noticed the slightest deviation in any of the parameters indicating that the main power unit was operating normally.

One cannot always chat with people servicing the operating instruments, mechanisms and assemblies. At times, however, one can tell from a single glance that in the situation everyone is prepared not merely to do their all, but to

arm themselves with patience, restraint and stamina for a lengthy confrontation with a powerful and treacherous "enemy."

The final conclusions from an analysis of the situation based on observations were now ready. As anticipated, the "enemy" submarine was traveling in the wake of some transports. Covered by their "acoustic shadow," it was attempting to approach undetected to within torpedo range. The sonar operators unerringly identified the target, however. A maneuvering duel began.

The "enemy" executed some intricate tacks in an attempt to get into position to attack. He could not be permitted to do this. Everything was just like a real battle. The only difference was that the warheads on the torpedos were dummies.

The torpedomen at the battle station commanded by Senior Seaman V. Kuznetsov had completed their collective labor. The target had been destroyed with the first salvo, at maximum range.

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